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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“The civil society and refugee women pushed hard for a rapid end to the war. 
They were in regular touch with Monrovia…On one occasion, when one woman received 
news of a relative having been killed in Monrovia, the group of women responded by 
physically blockading the door to the delegates’ meeting room for several hours, locking 
them in and refusing to let them leave…until they came to agreements” (Hayner 2007, p. 
12-13). Priscilla Hayner’s (2007) account of the 2003 Liberian peace accords in Accra, 
Ghana shed a positive light on the strategies and tactics of civil society actors present at 
the peace talks. Similarly, Hara (1999) notes the plethora of non-governmental 
organization (NGO) activities taking place along official Track I peace talks in Burundi. 
However, “private agents have certainly been eager to compensate for official diplomatic 
mistakes, but their initiatives, despite being widely and enthusiastically applied, not only 
have failed to solve the problems of communication gridlock but also have contributed to 
the harmful cacophony of competing, incompatible messages” (Hara 1999, p. 148). The 
differing analogies concerning the role of unofficial (Track II) actors in peace processes 
appears to be a matter of laudable heat tolerance versus crowdedness in the kitchen.1 The  
 




contrasting depictions raise the following questions: Is there a systematic impact of 
nongovernmental organizations on the creation of sustainable peace following a civil 
war? Do coordination and partnerships among domestic and international NGOs and 
with Track I mediators positively impact peace processes? Is the timing of the 
intervention significant? What is the impact on local civil society groups as highly-funded 
international NGOs move into peace negotiations?  
 Despite a dearth in cross-national data and quantitative studies on the role of 
Track II actors in peace negotiations, the conflict management and resolution literature 
suggests that NGOs can ripen a conflict for successful management attempts (Jessop et al 
2008), facilitate dialogue between disputants (Garb and Nan 2006), and contribute to a 
post-conflict environment that supports implementation of a peace agreement (Persbo 
2010). Looking at organizations specifically devoted to peace and conflict resolution 
(P/CRO), Gidron et al (2002) assert that such groups make three unique contributions to 
build peace. First, P/CROs attempt to shape public opinion through advocacy and 
strategic activism. Second, the organizations typically make an attempt to bridge divides 
and “reach out to the enemy” while engaging in conscience-raising activities.  
In a qualitative survey of 25 conflict negotiations around the globe from 1992 to 
2004, Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008) find a strong correlation between the inclusion of 
civil society actors in peace talks and a sustained peace agreement. According to their 
analysis, conflict negotiations that excluded civil society actors from the bargaining table 
experienced a cold peace or renewal of violence (with the lone exception of the Dayton 
Accords in 1995). Böhmelt (2010b) argues that the increased leverage and resources 
available to “Track 1.5” diplomatic strategies (conflict management attempts that involve 


both “official” state actors and “informal” actors) generally overcome the coordination 
problems outlined in the Burundi case above. His large-n study—the only one 
tangentially related to this phenomenon, to my knowledge—finds support for his theory, 
though Track 1 actors are likely to achieve successful outcomes on their own.   
The connection between an expansive coalition of actors during peace 
negotiations and their impact on sustained agreements constitutes a broad research 
agenda with several subsets including the dimensions of the conflict environment 
(Crocker et al 2005; Diehl and Druckman 2009), mediation context and processes 
(Bercovitch and Houston 2000; Crocker et al 1999; Kydd 2006), and institutional 
provisions within the peace agreement itself that shape the post-conflict environment 
(Walter 2002; Svensson 2009). This thesis investigates the cross-national impact of NGO 
involvement during and after peace agreements. A secondary proposition concerns the 
behavior of civil society groups during peace talks—is there anything unique about their 
actions that would conceivably lead to a sustainable peace? I posit that the connections 
domestic civil society actors establish with international nongovernmental organizations 
enhance their participation and influence in a peace process. Focusing my analysis in this 
manner allows me to synthesize the subfields of conflict mediation and make a 
substantive contribution to the literature examining the determinants of mediation 
outcomes.  
I endeavor to make a two-fold contribution to the academic and practitioner 
communities with this thesis. First, I have found only one quantitative study (Böhmelt 
2010b) that considers the impact of informal actors on the peace process. I build on 
Böhmelt’s (2010b) theory to develop a measure of civil society engagement in the peace 


process and derive additional hypotheses that are qualitatively tested. Additionally, I 
contribute to the qualitative investigations of this topic through a most similar systems 
structured case comparison of peace processes in Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri 
Lanka. Adapting Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) theory of transnational and domestic NGO 
partnerships to change state behavior, I specifically focus on the relationships, resources 
and institutional structures available to Track II actors as they attempt to influence peace 
outcomes. Given the explosive growth of NGOs over the past few decades, my study 
holds relevance for policy-makers as well. Generalizable assessments concerning the 
impact of NGOs can guide strategies for individual conflicts while my qualitative 
investigation yields insights regarding paths for increased cooperation and coordination 
among Track I and Track II actors.  
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter Two provides an overview of the several 
branches of literature germane to this research question. I identify actors, dynamics and 
institutions that influence outcomes throughout the entire peace process (during armed 
hostilities, attempts at conflict management and in the especially vulnerable periods of 
peace agreement implementation). Civil society actors, especially international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs), interact with these forces to play a role in peace 
outcomes. Since part of my theory suggests that domestic and international NGOs can 
amplify their impact through collaboration, I outline the literature on Transnational 
Advocacy Networks and empirical findings concerning TANs’ impact on support for 
human rights within formerly repressive regimes. Chapter Three develops my theoretical 
story detailing how and when I envision NGOs affecting peace outcomes. I argue that 
NGO involvement in the peace process provides additional leverage, information, 


representation, and assurance to skeptical or vulnerable participants (and the wider 
citizenry) during and after negotiations. As in the case of Burundi (Hara 1999), 
mitigating factors such as low state capacity, coordination problems or conflicting 
domestic and international NGO agendas may complicate my expected relationship 
between levels of INGO involvement and peace outcomes. Examining these opposing 
theoretical expectations in depth, I devise a four step process of domestic and 
international civil society partnership to influence state actors (and non-state disputants) 
during and after peace negotiations. Chapter Four details my research design. I adopt a 
qualitative approach and employ a most similar systems design to assess the impact of 
INGO membership levels in a country on conflict outcomes. INGO membership levels in 
a country does not necessarily translate into high Track II involvement in peace 
negotiations, but since my theory is based on the human and social capital provided by 
domestic and international NGOs during the peace process, I argue that this is an 
acceptable variable to consider during case selection. I draw on the literature covered in 
chapter two to find relevant control variables to make the cases as similar as possible. I 
qualitatively investigate the conflicts in Aceh, Indonesia; Mindanao, Philippines; and Sri 
Lanka in Chapter Five. Specifically, I cite evidence of civil society activities in each of 
those peace processes and evaluate their impact on the conflict outcome. In Chapter Six, I 
synthesize the findings of my quantitative investigations and underscore both the 
academic contribution and policy implications of my study. I conclude with a summary 
of my findings and suggestions for further research. 


CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature most germane to this thesis spans scholarship regarding the causes 
of conflict and conflict management responses by the international community. Within 
the conflict management literature, the impact of mediation on peace outcomes is most 
closely examined. Consider Figure 1 as a brief illustration of how these disparate 
branches of the literature interact to set the stage for my theory concerning the role of 
civil society actors in peace negotiations. Quantitative and qualitative findings from the 
cited studies inform my hypotheses concerning the impact of these actors and underscore 
alternative causal variables that are prudent to control for in my empirical investigation.  
Patterns within and Causes of Conflict, 1946-2009 
Patterns in war type and the location of conflict have shifted dramatically since 
the end of World War II and, when combined with systemic characteristics of the time 
period, have motivated new responses by the international community to war. The 
majority of the 232 conflicts since 1946 have been intra-state in nature (Gleditsch et al 
2002). Zones of conflict exists in Central and South America, a second in Eastern Europe 
and the Middle East and a third spanning the African continent (Gleditsch et al 2002). 
Regardless of time period, type or location, Diehl (2006) disaggregates war into four 
basic phases: 1) Initiation, 2) War Dynamics, 3) Escalation and  


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4) Post-War. The conflict management literature reveals that actors, events and 
interventions at various stages of conflict interact to influence post-war outcomes.   
Scholarship investigating the cause of war spans theoretical perspectives and 
methodological approaches. Rational choice theorists such as Fearon (1995) posit that 
war is a function of asymmetric or misinterpreted information, commitment problems and 
issue indivisibilities. While this widely-held theory perhaps explains the outbreak of 
violence, it abstracts away from the concrete issues of conflict that play a huge part in 
specific conflict escalations and settlements. Motivations for fighting that appear in 
Diehl’s (2006) initiation and escalation phases may evolve over time as the conflict 
deepens and becomes more intractable (Crocker et al 2005). For example, reporters and 
foreign policy scholars alike have thoroughly documented the Bush administration’s shift 
away from finding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq toward promoting human rights 
Initiation Dynamics Termination 
Mediation Context 
Actors 
Relationships 
Mediation Process 
Bias 
Strategies 
Figure 1: Conflict Processes and Determinants of Peace 
Figure 1 Sources: Bercovitch et al 1991, p. 11 and Diehl 2006 

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as evidence supporting the former justification failed to materialize (Shannon and Keller 
2007). Diehl (1992, p. 333) notes the traditional national and systemic variables thought 
to promote war—regime type, arms races, polarity, etc.—before underscoring the often-
neglected importance of issue salience. Fighting for control over territory or the executive 
branch influences the intractability, severity, and duration of a conflict that, as the 
following discussion illustrates, has a marked influence on peace outcomes. Turning to 
the focus of this thesis—intra-state conflict—the  key causal explanation for civil war 
rests within Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) “greed and grievance” model for predicting the 
outbreak of violence. According to their thesis, intra-state war is motivated by 1) 
disparities within society along economic, political or ethnic and religious lines and/or 2) 
the incentive and opportunity for rebel groups to organize—either taking advantage of a 
weak security apparatus for political gain or to exploit the natural resources of a state 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Daxecker (2011, p. 29) builds on this theory by illustrating 
how “shocks to state capabilities” such as an economic recession or changes in systemic 
polarities increase the risk of civil war. Given the impressive costs of civil war borne by 
the most vulnerable of civilians and the spillover effects across borders and into other 
issue areas—environmental and public health crises, for example—international efforts at 
conflict prevention, management and reconciliation have spiked in recent decades 
(Dayton 2004).  
International Conflict Management 
“Unlike traditional approaches to security management, such as collective defense 
or collective security, which involve formal obligations to undertake joint action in 
response to the actions of an aggressive state, today’s cooperative ventures seem to 


involve improvised strategies of collective action, often in response to one or more of a 
wide array of diverse security challenges [spanning] ‘traditional’…and ‘non-traditional’ 
threats such as organized crime, piracy, kidnapping…” (Crocker et al 2011, p. 39). 
Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) find four mechanisms of conflict settlement: 1) struggle, 2) 
negotiation, 3) mediation and 4) adjudication. Of the four, negotiation and mediation 
distribute the preponderance of dispute resolution power in a relatively more equitable 
fashion than either struggle (in which the more powerful power achieves victory or the 
war fizzles into a costly deadlock) or adjudication (in which power is delegated to a third 
party to determine the conflict outcome) (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992). Bercovitch et al 
(1997) add another dimension to the conflict management matrix by considering the 
number of parties present to settle the conflict. That is, conflicts can be settled 
unilaterally, bilaterally or through the inclusion of a third party (who could still engage in 
any of the four Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) options). International adjudication is perhaps 
the least frequently employed of Carnevale and Pruitt’s (1992) strategies because of the 
attachments to and concerns about the erosion of state sovereignty by placing decision-
making power in an international legal body (Babbitt and Hampson 2011). Negotiation is 
frequently used in several issue areas, especially in economic and trade discussions 
between countries; however, in the case of actual war, a third-party is often needed to 
facilitate dialogue between disputants. To that end, mediation is one of the most 
successful and most frequently used forms of dispute resolution not only in inter- and 
intra-state conflicts, but also in ancient Mesopotamian land disputes and modern 
employment discrimination cases (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992). As I elaborate further, this 
form of conflict management interacts heavily with conflict environment and bears 


significant influence on the dispute outcome.  First, however, it is prudent to clarify the 
conceptual challenges surrounding the idea of “success” in conflict management and 
settlement. 
“Whereas general conflict resolution focuses on seeking long-term remedies that 
address the root causes of conflict and all underlying issues, interventions in crises have a 
distinct mission…to terminate the immediate crisis before it escalates or spreads” 
(Wilkenfeld et al 2003, p. 281-282). Stern and Druckman (2000) caution against setting 
unrealistic expectations prior to a conflict interposition—lofty or miscommunicated 
expectations for a third-party intervention can quickly backfire among domestic 
audiences of the intervener and the local population of the targeted state. Babbitt and 
Hampson (2011) find a dichotomy in the conflict resolution literature between studies of 
“conflict transformation” and “conflict settlement.”  In connecting theory and practice, 
Babbitt and Hampson (2011) argue that the strategy and method of intervention should 
follow the goal. The main takeaway point for academics (and this study) is the need to 
delineate goals and time horizons when analyzing the success or failure of a particular 
peace process. To that end, Klein et al (2008) develop a peace scale indicating the nature 
of inter-state relationships that are not actively engaged in war. The scale between 
rivalry, negative peace and positive peace is a function of levels of conflict, 
communication, and agreement between a country-dyad. Although their scale 
characterizes inter-state behavior, the same logic applies within states as well—tensions 
between the government and opposition parties or rebel groups can wax and wane over 
time. In terms of the impact of civil society groups on peace outcomes, I argue that they 


push the conflict towards positive peace, not merely the end of armed hostilities between 
disputants (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008).  
Dynamics of the Conflict Environment and the Impact of Intervention 
The dynamics of the conflict environment not only predict the likelihood of 
success for conflict management attempts, but also correlate strongly with the degree of 
civil society involvement in peace negotiations. In their overview of the elements of a 
conflict that influence chances for a peaceful settlement, Diehl and Druckman (2009) 
identify three levels of the environment that interact to produce or prevent the success of 
mediation: characteristics of the conflict, local governance, and local population. The 
type of conflict, inter- or intra-state, and the issues at stake are indicators of conflict 
intractability. Civil wars are notoriously difficult to resolve peacefully as the sheer 
number of disputants (often adopting guerrilla, leaderless tactics) mean that the number 
of “spoilers” to peace negotiations is typically greater than in disputes between states. 
Motivations behind war are typically depicted in dichotomous terms: control of the 
government or territory (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2008a). Disputants typically 
hold strong emotional or economic attachment to territory in secessionist movements; 
consequently, it is harder to exchange this connection with side payments or issue linkage 
(Diehl and Druckman 2009). The involvement of foreign powers in an intra-state war 
further complicates peace calculations. The intervention of a major power on behalf of a 
combatant group, however, may present enough leverage to compel peace (Diehl and 
Druckman 2009). However, the strategic calculations needed to achieve the peace most 
satisfactory to the intervening power may run counter to civil society objectives, for 
example, for free and fair post-conflict elections. Geopolitical factors such as border 


permeability and location of natural resources or disputed territory also influence the 
tractability of a conflict and the likelihood of success facing an intervening party (Diehl 
and Druckman 2009).  
Central to the discussion surrounding conflict characteristics and intractability is 
the notion of intervention timing. Greig (2001) finds that early intervention in a dispute 
between rivals contributes to short term peace, but long-term peace is more associated 
with later interventions, after the disputants have had a chance to determine the true cost 
of maintaining the rivalry. Scholars of “ripeness theory” posit that conflict phases present 
windows of opportunity in which conflicts are amenable to settlement. Zartman (2001) 
declares that ripeness is a function of two perceptions among the disputants. Warring 
groups must perceive that they are locked in a “mutually hurting stalemate” with each 
other and view peace negotiations as a potential for a way out of the conflict. Mutually 
hurting stalemates without the second element increase the likelihood that disputants use 
the “time out” at the bargaining table to replenish arms and soldiers in order to win 
decisively at a later point in time. Through day to day activities pushing for peace, 
mediators and especially civil society actors can help create conditions of ripeness 
(Jessop et al 2008). For example, the Inter-religious Council of Sierra Leone played an 
instrumental role in convincing the disputants and wider civilian population of the costs 
of continuing to fight (Jessop et al 2008, p. 100). Additionally, the Council pursued 
conversations with leaders of rebel groups and established ties with one another, 
facilitating dialogue. 
“The success of any peace operation, especially a peacebuilding mission, is 
somewhat dependent on the degree to which it can draw upon the resources, capacity, and 


support of key actors in the host state” (Diehl and Druckman 2009, p. 19). Sullivan and 
Gartner (2006) find that regime type of the initiating state in a conflict is a strong 
predictor of dispute escalation and conflict outcome. Democracies are not only more 
likely to achieve their objectives without employing force, but also more likely to select 
out of disputes by making concessions to their opponent (Sullivan and Gartner 2006).  
The ability of a state to maintain control of its security forces and provide some 
semblance of public services during a civil war is a strong indicator of the survival 
chances of a state after the conflict (Goldstone 2008). That is, what barriers to state 
failure are available to mediators and disputants? The economic health of a country, 
possession of natural resources and a well-developed public infrastructure alleviate 
pressures on a newly formed post-conflict government. Additionally, characteristics of 
the local population influence chances for a durable peace. What cleavages are present in 
society? Demographics such as the state’s population, population density and level of 
human capital are also influential (Diehl and Druckman 2009). Civil society actors of 
course influence the mobilization potential of a population as they provide leadership and 
facilitate dialogue among like-minded civilians (Jenkins 1983). Additionally, Lipset 
(1994, p. 12-13) notes that “Civil organizations reduce resistance to unanticipated 
changes because they prevent the isolation of political institutions from the polity and can 
smooth over, or at least recognize, interest differences early on.” In the context of conflict 
negotiations, a strong civil society can “sell” a specific peace accord to a war-weary 
public (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008).  
The empirical record for various types of third-party conflict intervention—
namely peacekeeping and mediation—leads to conflicting policy recommendations. 

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Nonetheless, it is useful to briefly compare a few findings concerning mediation in 
“tough” cases and peacekeeping interventions (which, arguably, can be more severe or 
intractable than conflicts that are mediated only) (Rost and Greig 2011). Diehl and 
Bercovitch (1997) pose a “difficult test” for mediation effectiveness by assessing its 
impact on rivalry relationships. They find that mediation has neither a significant impact 
on preventing conflict between rivals nor on the severity of militarized interstate disputes. 
Given that a rivalry relationship, by definition, characterizes an intractable conflict, 
mediation’s dismal record is quite understandable. Regan (2002) focuses his investigation 
on civil wars, but considers the impact of third party “intervention” (which may or may 
not be more coercive and involved than mediation alone). Like Diehl and Bercovitch’s 
(1997) findings concerning mediation in rivalries, Regan (2002) deems third-party 
military and economic intervention in a civil conflict a poor tool for those interests in 
shortening the life of the dispute. Interacting one type of intervention—peacekeeping—
on prospects for mediation success in that same dispute, Greig and Diehl (2006) reach 
similarly pessimistic conclusions. Interacting mediation with the presence of 
peacekeepers foreshadows a branch of the literature most concerned with elements of the 
conflict that most impact mediation outcomes while raising awareness of possible 
selection effects within those cases.  
Mediation as a Tool of Conflict Management  
Scholars of mediation have struggled to develop a universal definition of 
mediation that encompasses the constitutive elements of the process. Nevertheless, a 
general consensus has emerged supporting Bercovitch et al’s (1991, p. 8) definition of 
mediation as a “process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, 


or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their 
conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or involving the 
authority of the law.” The last phrase, “involving the authority of the law” underscores 
the constraints upon mediators during peace negotiations—settlement authority lies 
firmly in the hands of the disputants. Perhaps the best way for a mediator to exercise 
power is in its soft form: getting the disputants to want what the mediator wants (peace) 
discreetly (Lukes 2004). As the discussion below elaborates, mediators have a number of 
tools available to entice or coerce disputants to agreement. General studies of mediation 
aggregate these approaches and tactics to consider the big picture impact on dispute 
resolution.  
The biggest question scholars have posed concerning mediation is whether it has 
any impact at all. Are mediated conflicts any more likely to experience peace than non-
mediated conflicts? Theoretical treatments of mediation most frequently take a 
benevolent view. Mediation can help each side achieve an acceptable minimum of its 
conflict goals through compensation for concessions. Additionally, time spent at the 
bargaining table facilitates dialogue and mutual understanding that enable the combatants 
to address the root causes of their disagreement. A more cynical view of this process 
argues that mediation simply provides a scapegoat in the third party, whereby disputants 
can make concessions while deflecting domestic audience costs. Focusing on interstate 
crises, Wilkenfeld et al (2003) use data from the International Crisis Behavior project to 
demonstrate that mediation has a positive impact on the reduction of tensions between 
disputants and contributes to long-term peace. While 38 percent of all interstate crises 
end in agreement, mediated crises boast a 62 percent success rate (Wilkenfeld et al 2003). 


However, Wilkenfeld et al (2003) note that international crises experience the most 
frequent offers of mediation. Perhaps the sudden eruption of interstate tensions catches 
the full attention of the international community and compels other powers to break out 
the biggest tools in their conflict management toolbox, before the situation escalates or 
widens to a regional crisis. 
The swift and powerful reaction of other states during an interstate crisis 
conceivably multiplies the effectiveness of mediation. But how effective is mediation in 
long-simmering disputes, such as those surrounding intra-state ethnic or religious 
rivalries. Bercovitch and Fretter (2007) find that 52 percent of mediations attempting to 
settle ethnic-cultural disputes are unsuccessful. Thinking about conflict in general and 
abstracting away from the specific motivations for fighting, Gartner and Bercovitch 
(2006) maintain that mediators take the hard cases. This selection effect builds the 
expectation that mediated settlements are short-lived compared to disputes that are settled 
without the assistance of a third party. However, given the emphasis on facilitation, 
communication and reconciliation during the mediation process, it seems equally 
plausible that mediated settlements endure in the long-term. Gartner and Bercovitch 
(2006) conclude that the opposing force that finally wins out in a dispute (the selection 
effect or the process effect) depends upon the strategy of the mediator. Facilitating 
communications involves the least effort on the part of the mediator, and is unlikely to 
alter the underlying nature of a dispute and generate durable agreements. 
 On the other hand, when a mediator is more heavily involved and expends 
greater resources, settlements are more likely to remain in force” (Gartner and Bercovitch 
2006, p. 835). Their finding illustrates how the context of the negotiations influences 


settlement duration. Other variables include the power and type of mediator(s) and their 
previous interactions with the disputants, as well as approaches (such as facilitative / 
communicative, procedural, or directive) that the mediator employs over the course of 
negotiations.  
Mediation Context 
The context of peace negotiations—particularly the characteristics of the 
mediator—typically direct the course of civil society engagement in the peace process. 
Activists can demand a seat at the bargaining table and access to disputants, but the 
mediator (as well as the combatants themselves) possesses considerable leverage over 
whether Track II objectives are sincerely considered.  
Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) identify five types of mediators:  individuals, 
states, regional organizations, international institutions and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs). While states are the most frequent type of 
mediator, the literature identifies a number of institutions and groups who serve as 
mediators with some actors, such as regional peacekeeping organizations and civil 
society groups, rising in prominence in the post-Cold War World. Parallel paths 
alongside official mediation provide new opportunities for informal communication 
between disputants and open the window for conflict resolution (Davies and Kaufman 
2002; Agha et al 2003; Kaye 2001). Böhmelt (2011) quantitatively investigates the 
impact of multi-party mediation—a frequent, but under examined phenomenon. He finds 
an inverted U-shape between the size of mediating coalitions and effectiveness (in terms 
of reaching a full settlement of the conflict). That is to say, a medium-size coalition of 
mediators is more likely to achieve a peaceful settlement than either a lone mediator or a 

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large group of actors. Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009) note the growth in 
nongovernmental mediating parties and the dearth of scholarship concerning faith-based 
actors in this process. Conditioned upon the disputants and nature of the conflict, 
Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009) argue that religious organizations convey a 
different type of legitimacy to and leverage over the peace negotiations. This influence 
can have dramatic impact as their examples from Quaker involvement in the Nigeria, the 
Inter-Religious Council in Sierra Leone, and the Community of Sant’Egidio in 
Mozambique attest.  
Most studies tie the institution mediating a dispute to the likelihood of a peaceful 
settlement. For example, Hansen et al (2008) suggest that highly institutionalized, highly 
democratic international organizations that possess the capability for binding settlement 
will be the most effective for conflict resolution. Likewise, Kelman (2006) envisions an 
“International Facilitating Service” that is “interactive, facilitated, nonbinding, 
confidential, exploratory, and problem-solving”—a complete conflict resolution machine 
(p. 213). Other scholars, such as Edward Azar, put stock in Track II negotiations and civil 
society actors to “ripen” a conflict for settlement. (Pruitt 1997; Davies and Kaufman 
2002; Agha et al 2003; Crocker et al 2005). Böhmelt’s (2010b) study supports this claim 
through quantitative investigation of integrated Tracks I and II diplomatic strategies and 
their impact on reaching a full settlement in peace negotiations. Wanis-St. John and Kew 
(2008) tout the benefits of inclusion of civil society actors in peace negotiations through 
cross-national comparisons of 25 conflicts during the 1990s through 2004—civil society 
inclusion is strongly correlated with lasting peace outcomes.  

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The power and resources available to the parties strongly determine the choices 
mediators’ employ (and reactions of the disputants). Bercovitch and Jackson (2009) 
discuss the behavioral differences between large mediating states and small mediating 
states. Large states frequently use their mediating leverage to promote or protect their 
interests while smaller states, such as Algeria, Norway and Switzerland, build their 
reputation as fair, impartial brokers (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009, p. 39).  
Turning to power disparities between rivals, Greig (2005) finds that evenly 
divided power plays in role in requesting mediation among disputants, but does not factor 
into considerations a mediating state makes when offering its services. In unequally 
divided disputes, Albin (1999) finds that weak parties are more likely to resort to ethical 
arguments during bargaining and implementation of agreements to leverage the power 
disparity.  Her case study of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) indicates that, because Israel possessed the economic and military 
strength to ensure their interests in deliberations over water rights, the PLO demanded 
capitulations by the Israelis over their conceptions of justice and fairness during the 
implementation of the agreement. Returning to Beardsley and Greig’s (2009) theory of 
“bargaining barriers”, Beardsley (2009, p. 272) argues that the same barriers to peace—
domestic audience costs, high levels of conflict, credibility problems—can be used to at 
least one disputants’ advantage in leveraging power over the mediator and “stalling.”  
 While scholars (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Greig 2005) have discussed 
selection effects in mediation, Melin and Svensson (2009) note another dynamic at play 
to explain the incidence of mediation (and give a hint as to how the settlement plays out). 
They suggest that, because mediation may convey legitimacy to non-state actors in civil 

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wars, sovereign parties are less likely to accept an offer of mediation. They find that this 
is indeed the case: while rebel groups more frequently seek mediation in an attempt to 
gain legitimacy, these potential recognition costs prevent a government embroiled in a 
civil war from accepting an offer of mediation until they expect that they cannot settle the 
dispute themselves. 
The historical and political ties between mediator and disputants have been 
explored at length in the literature (Greig and Regan 2008; Greig 2005; Bercovitch and 
Houston 2000; Melin and Svensson 2009). Summing up these studies, Greig and Regan 
(2008) find a positive relationship between the historical and political ties a third party 
has with parties in a civil war and offers of mediation; however, this turns into an inverse 
relationship when it comes to disputants’ acceptance.  
Crescenzi et al (2010) develop a top-down approach of third party mediation 
based upon systemic variables. Levels of democracy and institutions in the international 
system drive disputing parties to seek mediation (Mitchell 2002). Crescenzi et al (2005, 
p.1) offer the flip side of this argument: “By increasing the supply of credible mediators, 
global movements toward a strong democratic community increase the likelihood that 
potential mediators will intervene in contentious conflicts.”  
The onset of mediation can be explained by the type of conflict and ensuing cost-
benefit equilibrium between the disputants and mediator based upon historical and 
political ties between the parties. However, overall levels of democratic institutions and 
norms drive up the incidences of mediation (Crescenzi et al 2005). The material and 
cultural factors that drive mediators to offer intervention are often the same forces that 
lead disputants to reject such an offer. However, in cases where mediation occurs, these 


factors, in conjunction with the context of negotiations and other characteristics of the 
mediator, shape the approach a mediator takes in terms of impartiality or bias.   
Mediation Process 
 As with the characteristics of the mediator, the strategies they choose to employ 
over the course of the negotiations strongly impact the likelihood that civil society actors 
will be heard. The literature typically classifies mediator behavior into three categories: 
1) communicative-facilitative, 2) procedural and 3) directive (Bercovitch and Gartner 
2006). This taxonomy is a spectrum reflecting the mediator’s engagement in and 
commitment to conflict negotiations in terms of time, risk and resources.  
Communicative-facilitative strategies are the least intensive to the mediator(s) as 
their primary duty is to provide and transmit information to the disputants. Procedural 
strategies give a mediator more control over the agenda and schedule of peace 
negotiations while directive strategies feature a mediator attempting to change the peace 
calculus in the bargaining room by offer incentives (or threats) for the disputants to come 
to agreement. As mediators employ more directive strategies, the inclusion of civil 
society actors is encouraged to the degree that such inclusion suits the mediator’s interest 
in the conflict outcome.  
Tactics that mediators employ are fluid and not mutually exclusive. As elaborated 
below, choice of which of these strategies to employ is not only related to the context of 
the conflict, but also a function of mediator capabilities, reputation, and perceptions of 
bias or impartiality. The combination of these factors interacts to influence peace 
outcomes, the empirical record of which is additionally discussed below.  


Wilkenfeld et al (2003) suggests that mediators who adopt manipulative strategies 
are more successful in their efforts than are those who constrain themselves with a more 
facilitative approach. One of the key tools at a mediator’s disposal is the ability to control 
who is at the table and whose voice is heard the loudest (McClintock and Nahimana 
2008; Wanis-St. John 2008; Zartman 2008). Wanis-St. John (2008, p. 4) cites two 
opposing needs facing a mediator: “the need to produce negotiations that include the 
minimum number of factions/ participants required to get agreement [reduce the number 
of “spoilers” at the table] and the need to create the broadest possible support among the 
population and political parties for a peace process.”  
The importance given to perceptions of mediator impartiality has waxed and 
waned over time (Calvert 1986; Smith 1994; Kydd 2003; Rauchhaus 2006; Kydd 2006; 
Favretto 2009) with recent scholarship (Kydd 2006; Favretto 2009) settling on the notion 
that sometimes biased intervention is an effective tool for conflict management (a biased 
mediator will enforce peace settlements by military means). The crux of this argument 
about biased mediators rests with the credibility the mediator has in the eyes of its 
prodigy and opposition—the information biased mediators transmits to its favored party 
is more likely to be seen as credible, therefore, biased mediators can be counted on to 
deliver a disputant for costly concessions to reach agreement (or at the least, avoid a 
breakdown in talks and renewed fighting) (Maoz and Terris 2006).  
Smith (1994) suggests the level of coercion in a mediation process predicts the 
level of success a biased strategy will have. In providing private information, Rauchhaus 
(2006) finds that both biased and unbiased mediators can be effective. A final debate 
concerning mediation strategies and effectiveness concerns transparent versus secret 

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negotiations (Putnam and Carcasson 1997; Wall, Jr. et al 2001). Wall, Jr. et al (2001) 
suggests that highly visible mediators and negotiations enjoy a greater rate of success. 
However, Ramirez’s theory of audience costs argues that private negotiations insulate a 
leader from domestic punishments in response to his or her concessions.  
 For practitioners, cross-cultural negotiation experiences comprise one of the most 
important skills attainable (Mediator’s Toolkit 2009). Ramsbotham (2005) provides an 
overview of the scholastic debate concerning the normative extent cultural considerations 
should factor into mediation processes. In hierarchical fashion, the debate precedes as 
follows: “1) Cultural variation is not relevant to conflict resolution; 2) Cultural variation 
should be taken into account in conflict resolution, but only as a variable; 3) Cultural 
variation is fundamentally significant in conflict resolution and 4) Cultural variation 
reaches right to the bottom, precluding cross-cultural generalization” (Ramsbotham et al 
2005, p. 307). Tying into mediator tactics, Bercovitch and Houston (2000) suggest that 
culturally sensitive negotiations enhance opportunities for full peace. Additionally, 
mediator recognition of the unique cultural characteristics of civil society activists 
minimizes confusion and allows these groups to make more contributions to the peace 
process.   
 The attributes of the mediator, such as the training they’ve received and their 
ideology, play a role in selecting tactics and strategies for negotiations (Wall, Jr. et al 
2001). While not exactly a typology suitable for systematic study of mediations, 
McDonald (1996, p. 323-325) relies on personal experience to offer a general (and 
sometimes critical) view of the average American negotiator, offering that they are 
impatient, arrogant, poor listeners, culturally insular, legalistic, naïve, friendly, fair, 

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flexible, and innovative. Again, there is difficulty in examining these characteristics as 
generalizable across mediated conflicts; however, the perceptual influences of these 
attributes are ripe for constructivist analysis. State-level variation among mediating states 
affects both the offer to mediate and subsequent decisions to inscribe the negotiations 
with moralism (Touval 2003). 
  Broad consensus in the literature regarding disputants’ effects on mediation 
styles centers around past interactions with the mediating party and involvement in 
mediation generally (Wall, Jr. et al 2001; Bercovitch and Houston 2000). For example, 
mediators are more likely to rely on humor or other ice-breaking mechanisms when inter-
party trust is low (Wall, Jr. et al 2001).  Past and current ties with the mediator, such and 
political or economic alliances, influence both the onset of mediation and (most 
importantly) the perceptions of impartiality and legitimacy, if not the actual levels of 
impartiality and credibility (Bercovitch and Houston 2000).  
 A critical debate in the literature surrounding mediation strategies concerns timing 
effects (Wall, Jr. and Druckman 2003; Wall, Jr. et al 2001; Beardsley 2008; Mahieu 
2007).  Wall, Jr. et al (2001) suggest that time constraints combined with potential losses 
to the mediators from a failed resolution prompts more frequent and more pressing tactics 
to settle the dispute. However, adopting a broader view of mediation than Bercovitch and 
Jackson (2009), Wall, Jr. and Druckman (2003) include peacekeeping missions in their 
analysis and posit that time constraints mask differences in mediation approaches 
between severe and non-severe disputes. For example, there should be no difference in 
the number of mediation techniques applied to a non-severe conflict with no time 
constraints and a severe dispute under time pressure. Empirical analysis does not support 


the Wall, Jr. and Druckman (2003) hypothesis—the severity of the conflict overshadows 
any effects of time pressures. Mahieu (2007) tackles this debate from another angle and 
suggests that the timing of a ceasefire implementation is critical to its enduring success. 
She concludes that mediators affected by costs of a failed settlement are best served in 
developing consensus among warring parties regarding how to approach political issues 
driving the conflict and then quickly implementing a ceasefire before proceeding with 
negotiations (p. 224).  
  Post-Conflict Implementation and Durability of Peace Agreements  
 So far this thesis has discussed literature germane to explaining the interaction 
between conflict dynamics and mediation processes and the subsequent impact on peace 
outcomes. While these factors are crucial for enticing disputants reach an agreement in 
the first place, the post-conflict environment and implementation of the peace accord is a 
“treacherous transition period” (Rothchild 2002, p. 3). Peace accords are especially 
susceptible to fail and fighting to renew during this time because of uncertainties about 
the intentions of the disputants and third-party actors (Favretto 2009; Walter 2002).  
State capacity, specific elements of peace agreements such as transitional justice 
mechanisms, political power-sharing arrangements and third party security guarantees, 
and a sustained commitment to post-conflict economic development heavily influence the 
prospects for success of failure of peace accords (DeRouen et al 2010; Mukherjee 2006; 
Svensson 2009; Walter 2002). Again, domestic civil society and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) play a critical role in pushing the post-conflict 
environment towards sustained peace.  


One mechanism that intensifies the efforts of these Track II actors is their use of 
Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs). The synergy created by these partnerships 
constitutes the logical underpinnings of my theoretical explanation for the “peace impact” 
of domestic civil society and INGOs at every stage of a conflict. Briefly, I argue in the 
next chapter that the level of INGO involvement in a conflict-ridden state matters very 
much to the onset of conflict management attempts such as mediation, the participation of 
local and international “peace and conflict resolution” groups in negotiations, and the 
duration of peace.  
State Capacity 
Civil war is often thought of as a cause or consequence of state failure—the loss 
of a government’s legitimacy and effectiveness to provide public services, especially 
security. This measure of state capacity illustrates the resources available to civil society 
groups and the challenges that may arise in achieving their goals. This measure 
additionally serves as a potential agenda setting function for these groups as they engage 
in the peace process—perhaps the first goal is to end the fighting, then to focus on 
economic recovery before turning to human rights protections, for example.  
Goldstone (2008) identifies five pathways to state failure: 1) escalating ethnic 
conflicts, 2) state predation, 3) regional guerilla rebellion, 4) democratic collapse and 4) 
succession or reform crises in authoritarian states. The instability of a fragile or failing 
state in the wake of a civil war damage prospects for the implementation and longevity of 
peace agreements as regional or domestic actors will step in to fill the power-vacuum, 
triggering renewed violence. The institutional failure of state agencies may also create 
spillover effects like public health crises that dampen implementation and economic 

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development efforts. This idea of the ability of a state to provide services (with or without 
perceived legitimacy among its citizens) is known as “state capacity” (Arnold 1989; 
DeRouen et al 2010). DeRouen et al (2010) argue that “as state capacity increases, strong 
states should be better capable of successful implementation and would require very 
little-direct third-party intervention and implementation to ensure a successful outcome. 
In contrast, as state capacity declines, the need for a third party increases…When the 
state is incapable of carrying out even the simplest of tasks, third parties should act as a 
surrogate of the state and work to ensure that implementation is achieved” (p. 336).  They 
find that while intervention can help weak states implement peace agreements, in cases of 
very low state capacity, such as Somalia and Burundi, the willingness of third parties to 
contribute to implementation is not enough to supplant the havoc wrecked by an anarchic 
environment (DeRouen et al 2010). Goldstone (2005) implores third parties intervening 
in low-capacity / failing states to first determine whether the state suffers from low 
legitimacy, low effectiveness or both and then tailor assistance accordingly. Elections, 
security assistance and strategic allocation of foreign aid can help shift states back to the 
right path; INGOs and local civil society groups can also enhance the effectiveness of this 
Track I assistance from the international community (Van Tongeren et al 2005).  
Post-Conflict Economic Development 
Economic development in a post-conflict state, under the right conditions, can 
facilitate growth in state capacity through increased revenue, autonomy from donor 
agencies, and job opportunities for citizens. Unfortunately, Woodward (2002) asserts that 
the detrimental effects of civil war on a state’s economic trajectory are permanent—
economic conditions usually worsen after a civil war and they are subject to slower 

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growth than countries that did not experience a civil war. Despite this unhappy trend, 
economic revitalization is crucial to building confidence in the peace process and 
implementation of specific institutions within peace agreements. The provision of 
government services must also be equitable to all segments of the population for the 
peace to hold up over the long term.  
Two strategies guide economic development in post-war states. One involves 
NGOs and civilian forces to deploy aid and humanitarian relief rapidly. While the effects 
of this strategy are felt immediately, the transition to development strategies slows or is 
non-existent due to path dependence and organizational self-interest (Woodward 2002). 
The second strategy is most frequently employed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and attempts to encourage foreign direct investment by imposing conditions on 
loans that supposedly ameliorate investor concerns about inflation and corruption 
(Woodward 2002). Coordination problems and rigidities in conditionality policies of the 
International Financial Institutions frequently mitigate positive benefits of assistance to 
these societies. And, unlike other realms where increased INGO involvement bolsters 
local actor activities and increases the likelihood for sustained peace, in terms of 
economic development, INGOs may be part of the problem because they divert funds 
away from state agencies and local groups (Woodward 2002).  
Institutions within Peace Agreements 
 Peace settlements frequently move beyond ceasefires to immediately end armed 
hostilities and instead attempt a comprehensive agreement that addresses the root causes 
of conflict (or, at the very least, provides incentives and new institutions to reduce the 
likelihood of a renewal of violence down the road). The singular and collective impact of 

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transitional judicial reforms, political power-sharing pacts and third-party security 
guarantees have been debated at length within the literature. Examined to a lesser degree 
is the contribution civil society actors and INGOs make to the establishment and 
implementation of these regimes in post-conflict states. The inclusion of these 
agreements reflects the willingness of a third-party to consider longer time horizons than 
short-term ceasefires. Svensson (2009) suggests that biased mediators are more likely to 
expend resources and make costly commitments to ensure the establishment of elaborate 
institutional arrangements than are neutral mediators. In particular, “rebel-biased 
mediators tend to increase the likelihood of political power-sharing pacts and third-party 
security guarantees…while government-biased mediators increase the chance for 
provisions for territorial power-sharing pacts, government-sided amnesties and 
repatriation of civilians” (Svensson 2009, p. 448).  
 A crucial, if sometimes implicit, aspect of the peace process is to foster 
reconciliation among disputants and affected civilians. The issues that arise “when a 
government that has engaged in gross violations of human rights is succeeded by a 
regime more inclined to respect those rights” are known as transitional justice concerns 
(Olsen et al 2010, p. 805). Olsen et al (2010) identify five mechanisms of transitional 
justice post-conflict countries employ: 1) trials, 2) truth commissions, 3) amnesties, 4) 
reparations and 5) lustration policies.2  
Olsen et al (2010) note that elements of retributive or prosecutorial justice as well 
as mechanisms allowing for restorative justice are present in these mechanisms and 
further demonstrate that states may employ more than one of these institutions in the 
 


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post-conflict environment. They find that amnesty is the most frequently employed 
mechanism and, that within that subset, states more frequently grant amnesty to rebel 
groups before or after civil wars than use the process to account for their own role in 
human rights abuses (Olsen et al 2010). 
 Europe holds the regional lead for trials while truth commissions are frequently 
found in Latin American, African, and Asian countries (Olsen et al 2010). Looking at the 
impact of human rights trials in Latin America, Sikkink and Walling (2007, p. 428) find 
that the trials do not “undermine democracy or lead to an increase in human rights 
violations or conflict in Latin America.” Discussing the tactics most conducive to the 
protection of human rights and a sustained peace following conflict, Putnam (2002, p. 
257) asserts that “ IHROs [International Human Rights Organizations], working in 
conjunction with other components of peace operations, can orient their training and 
lobbying efforts toward facilitating the performance of key institutions such as the police 
and the judiciary, without which the prospects from sustainable peace often appear dim, 
and the prospects for sustainable rights, even dimmer.”   
 A second institution frequently found in peace agreements deals with political 
reforms in the post-conflict government. Power-sharing pacts and guidelines for elections 
may reassure rebel groups that they will be fairly represented in the new government, but 
the literature remains heavily divided regarding the impact of these institutions on 
sustained peace (DeRouen et al2009, Mukherjee 2006, Walter 2002). DeRouen et al 
(2009) find that political power-sharing agreements tend to fail sooner than institutions 
that do not require costly concessions by the government or result in delays in the 
implementation period. Other scholars (Hartzell 2009; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) argue 


that power-sharing agreements have a cumulative effect—policies that divide or share 
political, territorial, military and economic power—“foster a sense of security among 
former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to a self-enforcing peace” (Hartzell 
and Hoddie 2003, p. 318). Walter (2002) asserts that the number of power-sharing 
institutions is not sufficient to bring about peace because of expectations of weakness is 
post-conflict democratic institutions and civic culture. Sisk (1996) adds additional 
conditions affecting the likelihood of success of power-sharing agreements. First, 
decisions about whether to pursue consociational or integrative strategies should be based 
on considerations of feasibility and sustainability. Second, the power-sharing agreement 
is also subject to conflict ripeness, as discussed previously. Suggesting power-sharing too 
early in the conflict may result in the rejection of these mechanisms in favor of the 
potential for out and out victory while introducing the policies too late in the conflict 
meets barriers due to the deep antagonisms rooted in the conflict (Sisk 1996).  
 “Adversaries often compromise on the basic issues underlying their conflict, and 
they often find mutually acceptable solutions to their problems. Negotiations fail because 
combatants cannot credibly promise to abide by terms that create numerous opportunities 
for exploitation after the treaty is signed and implementation begins. Only if a third party 
is willing to enforce or verify demobilization and only if the combatants are willing to 
extend power-sharing guarantees, will promises to abide by the original terms be credible 
and negotiations succeed” (Walter 2002, p. 5-6).  
Walter’s (2002) credible commitment theory of peace implementation rests 
heavily on third party security guarantees to verify reciprocal demilitarization of rebel 
forces and to compel opposition forces to send costly signals to each other to underscore 

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their commitment to sustained peace. Without this outside intervention, disputants 
frequently find themselves stuck in a security dilemma—despite both parties truly 
wishing for peace and the implementation of their agreement, it is too risky to take the 
first step, demobilize, and leave oneself vulnerable to retaliation and dominance of the 
other force (Walter 2002).  
Triangulating methods, Walter (2002) builds a formal model specifying the 
conditions under which a peace agreement will be successfully implemented. She then 
looks at civil wars between 1940 and 1992 and finds that in 90 percent successful 
implementation rate of agreements featuring a third party security guarantee and power-
sharing pacts. While INGOs frequently lack the coercive leverage of intervening states, 
they can assist with monitoring and verification processes during the implementation of 
peace agreements (Albin 1999). Additionally, ties to Transnational Advocacy Networks 
amplify attempts to document and report violations of peace agreement terms. The 
growth of INGOs and spread of international norms promoting their inclusion in post-
conflict demobilization, reconciliation, and reconstruction should make its way into 
Walter’s (2002) theory of credible commitments in future conflicts (Prendergast and 
Plumb 2002).  
Growth of International Non-Governmental Organizations 
Thus far, this literature review has mostly covered the domestic level influences—
dynamics of the conflict environment, mediator strategies, etc.—on peace outcomes. 
However, similar to mediator characteristics interacting with the domestic conflict 
environment, other international level forces affect the likelihood of a successful 
settlement. Pivotal to this project are the multitudes of INGOs and their networks. In the 

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last twenty years, 50 countries have seen increases of over 500 percent in the number of 
human rights organizations active within its borders (Union of International Associations 
2008/2009; Murdie and Bhasin 2010, p. 2). Building on sociological theories concerning 
political opportunity structures, Reimann (2006) attempts to explain this phenomenon 
from a top-down perspective. The growth of international organizations and changes in 
state priorities relating to globalization in recent decades has created new mechanisms 
and incentives for resource mobilization and political access for INGOs (Reimann 2006). 
Additionally, pro-NGO norms in the international community pressure states to 
include INGOs in state and national policies (Reimann 2006). These norms are rooted in 
UN attempts to build “people participatory” approaches to conflict resolution in Central 
America during the 1990s—programs such as the International Conference on Central 
American Refugees (CIREFCA) and the Development Program for Refugees, Displaced 
and Repatriated Persons in Central America (PRODERE) legitimized INGO and local 
group consultations with states and “led to new understandings of the development 
process among state actors” (Reimann 2006, p. 62).  
Influential donor states additionally promoted the incorporation of pro-NGO 
norms within state policies while domestic activism helped to create a symbiotic 
relationship between states, local civil society actors and INGOs (Keck and Sikkink 
1998, Reimann 2006). For example, “Wary of giving too much to governments in the 
developing world, unwilling to greatly expand the UN’s operational capacity, and not 
always willing to expand their own bureaucratic and operational infrastructure, donor 
states have turns to service NGOs as a solution for implementing aid and providing relief 
in humanitarian crises” (Reimann 2006, p. 64).  

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The proliferation of INGOs from both bottom-up and top-down sources creates 
opportunities for these groups to partner with local actors to shape peace agreements and 
assist with their implementation, in addition to bolstering state capacity and fostering 
economic development—all forces that the post-conflict literature suggests positively 
correlate with sustained peace after a civil war. The emergence of Transnational 
Advocacy Networks magnifies the effect of INGO-domestic civil society partnerships on 
changes in state behavior.  
Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) and State-Society Relations 
 In their capacity to dramatically influence state-society relations, transnational 
advocacy networks (TANs) may pave the way to the bargaining table for domestic civil 
society actors as well as international human rights organizations (IHROs). TANs assist 
with the effectiveness and mission of domestic civil society groups, sometimes even 
stepping in to fill the void in states where civil society for whatever reason is weak or 
shallow. Adopting a multi-tiered “top down and bottom up” approach, TANs attempt to 
change illegitimate state behavior such as physical or civic repression. One of the ways 
TANs work from the bottom up is to influence the nature and frequency of domestic 
protest, albeit sometimes with unintended consequences. In combination with all these 
activities, TANs use their top down influence to enhance negotiations.  
 In areas where local civil society is absent, perhaps due to severely repressive 
tactics of an authoritarian state, transnational groups step in to help citizens organize and 
engage with each other. Sometimes this activity can carry with it a subversive or 
disobedient quality, as Kaldor and Kostovicova (2008) demonstrate in their discussion of 
U.K. based websites that help local Zimbabweans get around the hyperinflation plaguing 
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their country. Friends and family living in the UK can use these websites to “transfer 
money through the black market…buy groceries…and pay for doctor’s appointments and 
prescriptions” (Kaldor and Kostovicova 2008, p. 86). Like Twitter and Facebook’s roles 
in political dissidence, these networks can help citizens organize and combat the 
consequences of a delegitimized and tyrannical regime.  
 Examining issue emergence in the global sphere, Carpenter (2007) notes the less 
tangible effects of TANs on domestic civil society groups. She attempts to address why 
TANs pick up on some issues, such as child soldiers, and not others, such as children 
born of rape and sexual violence (Carpenter 2007, p. 100). Belloni (2008) ties 
Carpenter’s (2007) research agenda to its effect on local civil society groups. Taking a 
cue from the priorities of prominent (and deep-pocketed) TANs, local groups arrange 
their projects according to those most likely to receive attention and funding and not 
along some other criteria (such as achievability or effectiveness or urgency…) (Belloni 
2008). Carpenter (2007) suggests that issue attributes, pre-existing moral standards and 
specific, altruistically motivated individuals are the primary agenda setters among TANs. 
Similarly although less connected to funding concerns among domestic civil 
society actors, Bercovitch and Gordon (2008, p. 881) find a “triangulation between states, 
donors and human rights NGOs, whereby states have an impact on donor preferences, 
which, in turn, influences the agenda of human rights NGOs and their modes of 
operation, and these, in turn, help shape the kind of NGO criticism voiced against the 
state.”  This relationship means that domestic NGOs are typically structured more like 
businesses, that is, they are in a large part more responsive to their shareholders than to 
the people or issues they serve (Bercovitch and Gordon 2008). Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 
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6) run with this analysis, suggesting that the growth among IO’s and INGOs increases 
“uncertainty, competition and insecurity” for all organizations, both domestic and 
transnational. Encouraging transparency and extending the length of contracts can reduce 
the uncertainty that actors within TANs experience; in the meantime, Bercovitch and 
Gordon (2008) that the suboptimal outcomes for local civil society actors are merely 
rational responses to the current structure of incentives. As the above scholars have 
indicated, TANs can have both a positive and negative impact domestic civil society 
actors.  Given the likelihood for unintended consequences of a complex policy arena, this 
trend continues throughout the discussion of TANs influence on state-society relations.  
 Keck and Sikkink (1998) note the unique role TANs play in shaping domestic 
change, especially in regard to the human rights practices of states. TANs possess the 
ability to put illiberal states on the international agenda and threaten the scrutiny of 
outside states willing to coerce change (Risse et al 1999). Additionally, TANs work with 
domestic opposition groups and bring their stories to international attention. Linking 
domestic civil society actors to powerful TANs may also serve as a form of insurance or 
protection against the retaliatory fist of state security services.  
Examining the most common method of advocacy among international human 
rights organizations, “shaming and blaming”, Murdie and Davis (2011) ask whether this 
tactic actually has any impact on state behavior. Starting with the foundation of the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights and the establishment of major human rights organizations 
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, publicly calling out coercive 
regimes has been the modus operandi to advance changes in state behavior from a top 
down approach.  


Empirically, this perhaps has had less success than such TANs would like to 
admit. Hafner-Burton (2008) even found that Amnesty’s public reports condemning state 
sponsored torture resulted in increased levels of torture the following year (although it is 
difficult to sort out if this is a causal relationship or residual selection bias from Amnesty 
reporting on the “worst” or “escalating” human rights abusers). Noting that international 
human rights organizations also provide connections, funding and information to support 
domestic groups in efforts to pressure repressive states, Murdie and Davis (2011) include 
this alternative, bottom-up approach to changing state behavior in their model. In doing 
so they build off Risse et al’s (1999) “spiral model” explaining change in human rights 
practices.  
Risse et al (1999) commences its model with what they term the “boomerang 
effect.” Beleaguered domestic civil society groups reach out to TANs in the hopes of 
exerting top-down pressure on their repressive government while gaining bottom up 
support. The second phase features the repressive state denying allegations of human 
rights abuses (the necessity for a denial is simultaneously a concession that the abuses 
“had they occurred” would be wrong). Phase three finds the state making tactical 
concessions in an attempt to get the international community off its back, so to speak. 
Assuming these attempts are unsuccessful, phase four places the state in “prescriptive 
status.” An international pariah, the state “regularly refers to human rights norms to 
describe and comment on their own behavior and that of others; the validity claims of the 
norm are no longer controversial, even if the state continues to engage in rule-violating 
behavior” (Risse et al 1999, p. 29). Finally, the spiral culminates in the fifth phase, 
whereby the chastised and reformed state follows the rules. As I elaborate on in the next 
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chapter, transnational advocacy networks and their domestic counterparts work together 
in similar fashion to pressure states to settle civil wars peacefully.  
Consistent with the implications of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) theory, Murdie and 
Davis (2011) find that “shaming and blaming” is only effective when TANs employ this 
tactic in conjunction with support for domestic opposition groups and/or outside pressure 
by other states, individuals or organizations. Risse et al’s (1999) case study of political 
change in Kenya and Uganda demonstrate their “spiral model” in practice and affirm 
Murdie and Davis’ (2011) assertion that transnational activism in the form of “shaming 
and blaming” is not enough, inclusion of domestic groups is a necessary component of 
changes in state behavior. The Kenyan and Ugandan experiences also illustrate how 
TANs shape the nature of domestic protest in attempts to create bottom-up change.  
Advocating the benefits of nonviolent protest, Chenoweth and Stephan (2008) 
cited a success rate of 53 percent for major nonviolent campaigns, compared to a 26 
percent success rate for violent resistance. In addition to typically holding liberal and 
pacific values, TANs rely on statistics such as those produced by Chenoweth and 
Stephan’s (2008) scholarship to promote nonviolent resistance tactics among domestic 
civil society opposition groups. Bartley (2007) illustrates how the process of funding 
these domestic actors channels the nature of protest away from violent activities to 
moderate tactics and/or goals.  
Assessing the impact of TANs on domestic anti-government protest, Murdie and 
Bhasin (2010) tie the international NGO’s effectiveness to its level of commitment to 
domestic actors. They develop a three tiered index cataloguing an INGO’s activities in a 
targeted state: 1) the INGO only engages in remote “shaming and blaming”, 2) the INGO 
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sends volunteers to the field or otherwise works to build a local membership base or 3) 
the INGO establishes a permanent in-state office (Murdie and Bhasin 2010). While the 
INGO’s most likely hope to encourage nonviolent forms of protest, the inherent diffusion 
in such activities leads to unintended consequences (Andrews and Biggs 2006). The local 
attention generated by training in peaceful civil disobedience or organized protests, for 
example, frequently leads to more protest; however, the commitment to pacific tactics 
might not hold as much sway with newcomers to the movement (Murdie and Bhasin 
2010).  
 Albin (1999) asserts that the participation of NGO’s, both transnational and 
domestic, contribute positively to international negotiations. She identities seven 
functions that NGOs perform—some unique and all provided at least as well as, if not 
better, than formal Track I negotiators: 1) Problem definition, agenda-setting and goal 
setting; 2) Enforcement of principles and norms; 3) Provision of information and 
expertise; 4) Public advocacy and mobilization; 5) Lobbying; 6) Direct Participation in 
formation of agreements and 7) Provide monitoring and assistance with other issues of 
compliance (Albin 1999, p. 371).  
Pfaffenholz et al (2006) agree with her assessment and propose that domestic civil 
society actors are included in peace negotiations to a degree inversely proportional to the 
democratic nature of Track I parties. In his careful consideration of the role played by the 
Community of Sant’Egidio during peace negotiations between the Frelimo and Renamo 
parties in Mozambique, Bartoli (1999) notes the Catholic group’s instrumental value in 
serving as a conduit between disputants before the official peace talks commenced in 
Rome. The Community’s actions, in his view, ripened the conflict for resolution, thus 
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reaffirming Wanis-St. John and Kew’s (2008) normative implications concerning the 
relationship between civil society actors and sustained peace agreements.  
 The ability of TANs to shape state-society relations particularly in the realm of 
contentious politics and post-conflict negotiations has been outlined above. In the next 
chapter, I posit that there is a positive correlation between the presence of INGOs 
operating within a country embroiled in civil war and the inclusion of like-minded 
domestic civil society counterparts in peace negotiations. The INGO’s hand in bringing 
the domestic group to the bargaining table may be obvious due to public advocacy, 
perhaps. Alternatively, the training and resources provided by a committed INGO may 
prompt recipient domestic groups to take an assertive stand and elbow their way into the 
room, so to speak. Tracing the involvement of TANs during the peace negotiation 
process and its evolving relationship with relevant domestic groups offers the potential to 
further specify the impact civil society actors have in the peace process and the 
implementation of agreements. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THEORY 
“When people become directly affected by armed conflict, they develop a central 
interest in contributing to its resolution. Despite being confronted with harsh realities 
and huge dilemmas, civil-society actors can make significant contributions to peace 
processes. The capacities may help to create the conditions for talks, build confidence 
between the parties, shape the conduct and content of negotiations and influence the 
sustainability of peace agreements” (McKeon 2005, p. 567).  
 As McKeon (2005) suggests, NGOs and other civil society actors can have 
significant impact at every stage in the peace process. The logic behind this expectation is 
the argument that NGOs / civil society actors provide Track I mediators with additional 
leverage, information, representation, and assurance to skeptical or vulnerable 
participants (and the wider citizenry) during and after negotiations. As outlined in the 
literature review, the activities of NGOs and civil society representatives interact with the 
conflict environment to create incentives for peaceful settlement.  
As in the case of Burundi (Hara 1999), mitigating factors such as low state 
capacity, coordination problems or conflicting domestic and international NGO agendas  
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may complicate my expected relationship between levels of INGO involvement and peace 
outcomes. Therefore, my theory can be thought of in two stages. I offer a leverage-based 
explanation for my expectations of a cross-national impact of NGOs on peace outcomes; 
however, I condition this leverage with elements of cooperation among interveners necessarily 
for the benefits of D / INGO involvement to materialize. Borrowing from Keck and Sikkink’s 
(1998) spiral model of Transnational Advocacy Networks, I devise a four step process of 
domestic and international civil society collaboration to influence state actors (and non-state 
disputants) during and after peace negotiations. Briefly, this process represents a spiral of 
deepening ties between domestic and international NGOs and other civil society actors that 
maximize the informational and representative leverage both groups can bear upon conflict 
management attempts. Explaining and examining the impact of various Track II activities during 
the peace process furthers the development of a reliable and valid cross-national measure of civil 
society engagement in the peace process. Furthermore, tracing the four-step process illustrates 
how these weaker coalitions of actors come to have a collective impact on conflict outcomes.  
Given the dominance of Track I actors in conflict management, the involvement of NGOs 
and civil society actors in the peace process can frequently be conceptualized as multiparty 
mediation. Böhmelt (2011) suggests that involving multiple actors in a diplomatic intervention 
increases leverage over the disputants because of the combined resources at the disposal of the 
mediating parties. Additionally, the burdens and risks of mediation can be spread evenly over the 
interveners, deflecting their domestic audience costs to others (Crocker et al 1999). Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) note that in complex scenarios (in their study, state human rights practices) 
require that weaker actors use every advantage to influence policy changes. Through cooperation 
with more powerful actors and linking issues to material or moral concerns, “weak groups gain 
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influence far beyond their ability to influence state practices directly” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 
p. 23). Track I mediators may have more resources at their disposal, such as aid assistance or 
peacekeepers; however, NGOs and other informal actors can provide leverage to the negotiations 
through providing unique information, advocacy, and their capacity for public mobilization 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al 1999; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008).  
Figure 2 depicts a conceptual map of the interactions and unique contributions of local 
and international NGO involvement in peace negotiations. The dashed lines represent the notion 
that connections of domestic and international NGOs to Track 1 mediators and the actual peace 
negotiations do not occur in every peace process (though I posit that these connections especially 
strengthen the likelihood of a sustained peace). Under each Track II actor involved in the peace 
process is a list of possible tools at their disposal to influence conflict outcomes.  
INGOs bring technical expertise, financial resources and top-down pressure on 
combatants to the peace process. Additionally, they, through the use of Transnational Advocacy 
Networks, have tremendous capacity for advocacy and reporting human rights abuses in 
conflicts. INGOs may have the same mission, but specialize in certain activities or tactics. For 
example, Amnesty International and the International Red Cross have similar missions for peace, 
but diverging approaches to achieving their goals—most notably, Amnesty publishes their 
findings on human rights abuses regularly, while the Red Cross privately urges states to reform 
their behavior (in order to maintain access to internally displaced persons or prisoners). INGOs 
also interact with mediators to advocate for specific mediation strategies or offer resources to 
build a sustainable peace agreement (such as offering to monitor peace agreements or establish a 
truth and reconciliation committee.  
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Mediators in this process have the power of their state or institution behind them. They 
can offer carrots such as peacekeepers and reconstruction funding or sticks like the threat of 
sanctions or more coercive intervention to the combatants to urge them to accept the terms of a 
peace agreement. Mediators who adopt a softer approach or are neutral to the conflict outcome 
may focus on facilitating dialogue between combatants (activities that INGOs such as the Olaf 
Palme International Center may facilitate). Combatants hold the power to continue or unilaterally 
end peace negotiations and to accept or reject the terms of a peace agreement. Their 
receptiveness to civil society / NGO involvement in the peace process is also a crucial factor in 
determining where on the inclusion-exclusion spectrum the peace negotiations lie.  
Local NGOs engage in similar ways with the peace process as INGOs, but from a 
different perspective. When they pressure or facilitate dialogue between disputants, they are 
speaking on behalf of the people most affected by conflict, civilians. They have an informational 
advantage over INGOs and perhaps have more credibility to mobilize the public to support 
peace. INGOs partner with local NGOs to raise awareness about the conflict and maximize the 
impact of limited resources. Local and INGOs may hold peace workshops to train activists in 
non-violent forms of protest or how to engage in dialogue with members of the opposition.  
The last actor with influence over the peace process is the public at large. It is their 
support that, at times, fuels rebel activities and they hold the power to legitimate a peace 
agreement or break off into a new rebel faction. The public also plays a role in implementing 
peace agreements, by setting up civilian monitoring committees or participating in truth and 
reconciliation commissions. Local NGOs serve as a conduit between public’s needs and 
demands, the combatants, and the international community. Below I elaborate on how local 
NGOs maximize their leverage over the peace process.  
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McKeon (2005, p. 569) argues that “the state-based international system is comparatively 
ill-equipped to deal with the people involved in localized armed violence. In such situations, 
civil-society actors—whether indigenous or external—are arguably best-placed to complement 
state-driven diplomatic efforts at the leadership level, given their comparatively low-profile 
access within communities and greater flexibility than —from the needs of militants during the 
demobilization process to testimonies of human rights abuses at the hands of rebel groups or 
state armed forces (Serbin 2005).  
In addition to the transmission of technical reports and dramatic anecdotes from the “fog 
of war” to the international community, local and international NGOs can serve as go-betweens 
for Track 1 mediators and disputants as well as conduits between combatants. For example, 
Strimling (2006) discusses the cooperation between the Conflict Management Group and the 
U.S. Department of State during facilitation between Ecuador and Peru in 1998. As mentioned 
previously, Bartoli’s (1999) analysis of the role of the Community of Sant’Egidio in the 
Mozambique peace process remains a powerful example of the impact local actors can have in 
maintaining dialogue between disputants, even when official negotiations have stalled.  
Closely related to the unique informational contribution of NGOs and local civil society 
groups is their capacity for advocacy. Reporting narratives from the situation on the ground can 
be a powerful catalyst to spur or renew the international community’s commitment to conflict 
management. Additionally, providing a voice for the most vulnerable citizens affected by war 
introduces another level of representation to the peace process. This representation may lead to 
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NGOs lobbying for specific institutions or protections for their constituents in peace agreements; 
institutions that may support a sustained peace environment if implemented. However, just who 
the NGO represents and advocates for is an important caveat that will be discussed in more detail 
later (Assefa 2004). 
Another aspect of NGO impact on peace processes considers their capacity to mobilize 
both the international community and domestic populations. Arguing that Peace and Conflict 
Resolution Organizations (P / CROs) possess many of the same characteristics as social 
movement organizations, Gidron et al (2002, p. 18) assert that P/ CROs “capacity to recruit 
members, links to other organizations providing funding, legitimacy and expertise” influenced 
peace outcomes in Northern Ireland, Israel / Palestine, and South Africa . NGOs that can 
mobilize the public create an incentive for those at the bargaining table to consider broader 
factors in their peace agreements. Keck and Sikkink (1998) assert that including and mobilizing 
the public not only provide the informational and advocacy advantages discussed above, but 
introduces  “moral leverage…where the behavior of target actors is held up to the light of 
international scrutiny” (p. 23).  
 Rather than adopting a ceasefire, public opinion can help mediators facilitate a 
comprehensive agreement. Through providing information, engaging in advocacy and 
mobilization strategies, INGOs and local actors can leverage their involvement in peace 
negotiations. These activities additionally hold strong sway over public perceptions of conflict 
negotiations—perhaps soft power for some Track II actors participating in the peace process 
(Nye 2004). The elements of leverage these actors can bring to the mediation process lead to my 
first hypothesis:  
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H1: Conflict management attempts in states with higher levels of domestic and INGO 
involvement (D/ INGO) will be more likely to end in a partial or full peace agreement than in 
states with low levels of Track II involvement. 
 A final manner in which NGOs may impact peace negotiations is at the implementation 
stage of peace agreements. The level of NGO and civil society membership in a country may be 
a good proxy variable for the amount of human and social capital available to implement peace. 
As detailed in Chapter Two, the time period immediately following a conflict is especially 
vulnerable to renewed violence (Rothchild 2002). Walter (2002) asserts that combatants, despite 
agreeing to the terms of a peace agreement, sometimes become locked in a security dilemma 
because they cannot be certain that their opponent is disarming at the same rate (or at all), for 
example. Through its monitoring and verification capacity, I argue that NGOs are well-suited to 
oversee the implementation of peace agreement provisions and reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding this process through introduction of what Keck and Sikkink (1998) deem 
“accountability politics” (p. 24). Persbo (2010) notes that NGOs are propping up that serve this 
very purpose in a wide range of issue areas, from Global Witness’s work in ensuring diamonds 
are conflict-free to Landmine Monitor—a group monitoring compliance to the 1999 Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Mediators with greater interest in conflict outcomes are more 
likely to push for institutions in peace agreements that help a state recover after a civil war 
(Svensson 2009); it follows that NGOs devoted to peace and conflict resolution would be 
especially willing to assist with the implementation of such agreements.  
H2: Peace agreements signed in states with higher levels of D / INGO involvement will be more 
likely to endure than peace agreements signed in states with lower levels of D/ INGO 
involvement. 


H3: Peace agreements signed in states with higher levels of D / INGO involvement will be more 
likely to include institutions such as transitional justice mechanisms, power-sharing pacts, and 
specific protections for human rights than peace agreements signed in states with lower levels of 
D / INGO involvement. 
 As the unsuccessful mediation attempts in Burundi (Hara 1999) indicate, “multiparty 
mediation may lead to serious co-ordination problems and a lack of transparency over the 
allocation of responsibilities” (Böhmelt 2011). Conflicting agendas stemming from NGOs 
representing different societal groups (sometimes with sympathies to claims of one combatant 
over the other) may create more discord in the peace process than fostering conditions for the 
achievement and implementation of a peace agreement (Assefa 2005). Despite these 
contradictory claims found within the literature (Assefa 2005; Böhmelt 2011; Crocker et al 
1999), I argue that, in the aggregate (and especially over time), NGOs and state actors have 
fostered new paths to cooperation such that the benefits their involvement brings to peace 
outcomes are experienced more frequently. I posit that the concerns about multi-party mediation 
implied in a title like Herding Cats (Crocker et al 1999) are a powerful explanation for outlier 
cases, assuming the general trend is a positive relationship between NGO involvement and peace 
outcomes.  
 A model that “highlights relationships, resources, and institutional structures” may 
reconcile the diverging claims about the impact of Track II actors on peace negotiations by 
determining the likelihood of the cooperation or discord among actors in the process. 
Qualitatively examining cases for the presence of Transnational Advocacy Networks may shed 
significant light on the means by which some Track II actors in some peace processes overcome 
the cooperation and coordination problems detailed above. Keck and Sikkink (1998) assert that 
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“transnational advocacy networks appear most likely to emerge around those issues where 1) 
channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered…2) activists 
or ‘political entrepreneurs’ believe that networking will further their mission and campaigns; and 
3) conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and 
strengthening networks” (p. 12). Building off of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) spiral model for the 
establishment of an effective Transnational Advocacy Network to influence a state’s human 
rights performance, I create a four step process demonstrating the role and impact of domestic 
and international NGO partnerships at every phase of a conflict (See Figure 3). These stages are 
based upon the mechanisms of leverage I indentified previously to explain why I expect NGO 
involvement to positively impact peace processes in the aggregate. I anticipate that cases that do 
not fit this pattern (such as Burundi (Hara 1999)) will also fail to follow the four stages I outline 
below.  
 The stages of this process correspond to elements of the conflict environment. During 
active armed hostilities between state security forces and at least one opposition group, I 
anticipate that the main goal of domestic and/or international NGOs will center on bringing the 
disputants to the bargaining table and enacting a ceasefire. As local actors will have much more 
information during the initial stages of a conflict, domestic NGOs should take the lead in step 
one. That is to say, civil society actors / domestic NGOs (DNGOs) will reach out to the 
international community to implement conflict management attempts. Specifically, these actors 
will seek partnerships with INGOs to leverage influence in the international sphere and acquire 
resources to help ripen the local environment for negotiations. Simultaneously, DNGOs spring 
into action to raise domestic awareness, mobilize the public and influence perceptions about the 
need to end the conflict quickly.  
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The second step occurs upon INGOs receiving the DNGOs appeals for involvement. 
Through Transnational Advocacy Networks, INGOs raise awareness of the conflict situation at 
regional and international forums and pressure disputants to adhere to human rights norms, turn 
to non-violent dispute resolution mechanisms, etc. Additionally, to deepen partnerships and gain 
additional information to send through the network, INGOs may provide funding to their 
domestic counterparts. As these domestic and international partnerships deepen, these actors 
(along with other actors in the international community—states and organizations—and perhaps 
the disputants themselves) shift the conflict environment to support peace negotiations.  
During this phase of the conflict, hostilities may or may not be active, but conflict 
management attempts are underway. D / INGO involvement at this stage (3) focuses on shaping 
interactions between disputants during negotiations. To this end, D / INGO groups may facilitate 
dialogue and serve as a conduit for information between the groups. Additionally, they may use 
their moral leverage to advocate respect for human rights and the establishment of institutions in 
the peace agreement to protect those rights. I argue that these efforts are more effective if these 
actors are actually present at the bargaining table; however, it is not a necessary condition for the 
success of negotiations.  
If there is a breakdown in talks and / or resumption in violence, the domestic and 
international NGO partnerships should cycle back to step one and again attempt to persuade the 
disputants to return to mediation. Once, however, the disputants reach a peace agreement, D / 
INGOs play a vital role in the implementation of this agreement and in societal recovery from 
the conflict. Additionally, INGO efforts may turn away from peace and conflict resolution efforts 
towards economic development as a way to prevent future conflict and pave the way for 
sustainable democratic political system.  
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Figure 3: Establishment and Impact of Transnational Advocacy Network in 
Peace Process 
 
Phase of Conflict: Active armed hostilities between state security forces and at least 
one opposition group 
 
Step One: Civil Society Actors / Domestic NGOs reach out to international community to 
implement conflict management attempts; specifically partner with INGOs to leverage 
influence in international sphere. Simultaneously work to raise domestic awareness, mobilize 
the public and influence perceptions about conflict management attempts. 
 
Step Two: INGOs, through TANs, raise awareness of conflict situation at regional and 
international level; fund domestic NGOs / civil society groups; and pressure disputants to 
adhere to human rights norms and mechanisms for dispute resolution.  
 
Phase of Conflict: Hostilities may or may not be active; International Conflict 
Management attempts—Mediation with or without other mechanisms such as 
peacekeeping forces—underway  
 
Step Three: Domestic and international NGO involvement in peace negotiations to shape 
peace, facilitate dialogue among combatants; “ripen” conflict for peace. (Caveat: I posit that 
efforts at this stage are more effective if these actors are actually present at the bargaining 
table; however, I do not require this as a necessary condition for this step in the model). 
 
Phase of Conflict: Peace Agreement (proceed to step 4) or breakdown in talks / 
resumption in violence (return to step 1)  
 
Step Four: Domestic and international NGOs work to implement peace agreements, promote 
reconciliation, and foster economic development.  
 
Phase of Conflict: Enduring peace or renewal of violence (return to step 1) 
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This four-stage process leads to two final hypotheses:  
H4: Domestic NGOs with similar missions and agendas will be more likely to partner and 
cooperate with like-minded INGOs during the peace process than D/ INGOs of diverging 
philosophies or purposes. 
H5: Peace processes that experience high levels of D / INGO involvement, but little cooperation 
and coordination among state and Track II actors (and the Track II actors with each other) will 
be less likely to experience sustained peace outcomes than cases that have both high levels of D / 
INGO involvement and cooperation with conflict managers.  
The four-stage process is just one way to think about the interaction between domestic 
and international groups with phases of the conflict. Another layer of this interaction concerns 
the depth of these groups’ involvement during each phase of the conflict. NGOs and civil society 
actors have a variety of tools at their disposal to shift public opinion towards peace and persuade 
elites to adopt certain policies. Some of these activities, such as advocacy for those most 
vulnerable to the effects of war and reporting human rights violations, can be conducted at any 
phase of the conflict cycle. Others, like monitoring ceasefires, are by virtue confined to one 
particular phase of the conflict, in this example, the de-escalation / implementation phase. 
 Figure 4 depicts the various types of exercises that I envision NGOs and other civil 
society actors use to influence conflict outcomes. Activities listed at the top of the graph are 
those which could be undertaken during multiple phases of the conflict while those at the end of 
the list are confined to one phase. I argue that, more important than participation in any particular 
activity or combination of activities, is sustained, consistent NGO engagement during all phases 
of the conflict. Continuous NGO / civil society interaction with the public and elites during 
hostilities and peace negotiations will boost the credibility of Track II efforts and, I posit, boost 
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their influence on conflict outcomes. Unlike the previous figure, this causal mechanism is not 
entirely dependent upon cooperation and collaboration between domestic and international 
NGOs. However, cooperation among levels will leverage this influence further. Formally stated: 
H6: Conflicts that feature sustained NGO engagement across all phases of fighting—active 
armed hostilities, peace negotiations, and peace agreement implementation—will be more likely 
to experience sustained peace than conflicts with little or inconsistent NGO engagement. 
Table 1: Types of NGO engagement during all conflict phases 
 Outbreak of 
Armed Hostilities 
Peace Negotiations Peace Agreement 
(PA) 
Implementation 
Advocacy / Pressure 
Disputants 
X X X 
Mobilize Public X X X 
Peace Workshops / 
Peace Education 
X X X 
Human Rights 
Documentation 
X X X 
Facilitate Dialogue X X X 
Consultation / 
Technical Expertise 
 X X 
Economic 
Development 
 X X 
Monitor PA 
Implementation 
  X 
Assist with 
Combatant 
Demobilization and 
Reintegration 
  X 
Facilitate Democratic 
Transition / Elections 
  X 
 
The “X” pattern in the conflict phase columns represents the ideal nature of Track II 
engagement during a civil war. The pattern indicates early engagement with the public and elites 
at the conflict’s onset. This engagement does not dissipate or waver as the conflict progresses to 
other stages, despite these actors relying on other, phase-dependent means of influencing conflict 


outcomes. Instead, NGOs and civil society actors remain connected to the key players in the 
dispute—the combatants themselves, elites appointed to settle the conflict, and the broader 
citizenry from which the combatants draw fighters and support or moral justification. Of course, 
in the real world of limited resources and budgets, it is not always possible to achieve this ideal 
of maximum engagement. However, I posit that conflicts will have a better chance at 
experiencing sustained peace if these Track II actors can adopt a strategy of comparative 
advantage with certain groups specializing in one particular activity, such as economic 
development or ceasefire monitoring, thereby freeing up resources for other NGOs to participate 
in general peacebuilding activities, like organizing nonviolent protests or facilitating dialogue 
among disputants. In the next chapter I discuss my quantitative and qualitative research design 
for testing my theoretical expectations. 


CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The methodology employed in this study has elements of both theory-testing and 
theory-generating qualitative research design. My theory concerning the means by which 
informal actors in peace negotiations leverage their influence over conflict outcomes 
builds upon findings from the academic and practitioner literature. However, in-depth 
investigations of peace processes in a few civil wars yield the possibility for clarifying 
my theory and more accurately articulating the ways in which NGOs and civil society 
actors work together and with their international counterparts during different phases of 
the conflict cycle. To my knowledge, there is not yet a measure available for 
quantitatively testing of NGO engagement in the peace process. Some measures, such as 
Bercovitch and Houston (2000), identify “mediator type” in conflict negations and 
specify whether the mediator was a part of an NGO. However, mediation is but one small 
part of the entire peace process and captures only one way in which these Track II actors 
can influence conflict outcomes—by directly leading peace negotiations. Identifying the 
ways in which NGOs participate in the peace process and the timing of their interventions 
outlines a framework for a measure of NGO engagement that could be employed across a 
variety of conflicts. 


This study adopts the peace process as its unit of analysis. This includes 
interactions related to ending the conflict between combatants, the international 
community, domestic NGOs and civil society actors, and the public during armed 
hostilities, peace negotiations facilitated or mediated by a third party, and during 
implementation of a resulting peace agreement. I analyze three civil wars from Central 
and Southeast Asia—the Aceh-Indonesian conflict, the Mindanao-Philippines conflict, 
and the Tamil-Sri Lankan war—from the 1970s up to the present day. These cases were 
selected according to a most similar systems design that will be described in detail below.  
The dependent variable in this project has been used interchangeably as either 
“conflict outcome” or “peace outcome.” There are several ways in which this concept can 
be operationalized (Klein et al 2008). A weak idea of peace is that active, armed 
hostilities cease. However, I adopt a richer definition of peace when discussing the idea 
of “sustained peace” in my theory. While this could be defined as entire resolution of the 
conflict, the operationalization I employ for hypothesis evaluation is a middle group 
between the weak / no active fighting and a full resolution of the underlying motivations 
fueling the conflict, such as goals for independence among a subset population of the 
state. That is to say, in order to find confirmation for a hypothesis, the conflict must end 
with a ceasefire or peace agreement that does not break down within five years of the 
signing. While I do not require evidence of the combatants forfeiting their goals entirely, 
there must be indications that the parties are engaged in a good faith effort to uphold the 
peace agreement (and not merely using the ceasefire to replenish their weapons supply, 
for example). In order to determine if there is partial support for a hypothesis, I look at 
the various components building an ultimately unsustainable peace agreement. For 

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example, if there is a direct link between an NGO activity (monitoring a ceasefire) and an 
outcome (ceasefire holds for X number of months), I will consider this when evaluating 
the amount of impact Track II actors have a particular peace process.  
The independent variable is “NGO / civil society engagement” in the peace 
process. Again, this can be conceptualized in a multitude of ways, as outlined in my 
theory. To recap, I define civil society as “the vast array of public-oriented associations 
that are not formal parts of the governing institutions of the state: everything from 
community associations to religious institutions, trade unions, nongovernmental 
organizations (such as human rights groups, relief organizations, development 
organizations and conflict resolution groups), business associations and professional 
associations such as the Bar or accountants’ associations” (Wanis-St. John and Kew, p. 
15).  
Engagement can be thought of as any of the activities listed in Table 1—
facilitating dialogue, documenting human rights violations, fostering economic 
development, etc. As the timing of intervention plays an important explanatory role in my 
theory of NGO leverage over the peace process, I rely on Diehl and Druckman’s (2009) 
understanding of the conflict cycle. I divide the conflict into three phases—active armed 
hostilities, peace negotiations, and the post-conflict implementation of a peace 
agreement. Throughout the qualitative investigation I will also evaluate cooperation 
between domestic and international NGOs by looking for evidence of INGOs funding 
domestic groups, domestic groups reaching out to INGOs to gain the audience of the 
international community, and other instance of collaborated efforts among the two levels 
(such as jointly hosting peace education workshops).  

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“A plausibility probe is comparable to a pilot study in experimental or survey 
research. It allows the research to sharpen a hypothesis or theory, to refine the 
operationalization or measurement of key variables, or to explore the suitability of a 
particular case as a vehicle for testing a theory before engaging in a costly and time-
consuming research effort, whether that effort involves a major quantitative data 
collection project, extensive fieldwork, a large survey or detailed archival work” (Levy 
2008, p. 6). Adopting a slightly stricter version of a plausibility probe will allow me to 
evaluate and refine my theoretical expectations. It also permits latitude to investigate the 
conflict throughout all stages of the peace process and identify additional causal 
mechanisms or new patterns of NGO behavior to influence conflict outcomes. The 
comparative analysis will help to determine the explanatory power of my theory when 
controlling for alternative explanations, such as Walter’s (2002) third-party security 
guarantee thesis.  
In order to introduce variance into my dependent variable and make my results a 
little more generalizable, I select three cases according to a most-similar systems design. 
This design attempts to match cases where as many independent variables as possible are 
similar while the dependent variable varies (Levy 2008). I created a list of easily-
measured variables from the literature known to affect conflict outcomes—conflict 
duration and severity, mediator type and bias, and mediation attempts. Additionally I 
looked at the type of conflict (territorial conflict or demands for a change in government) 
and the region to hold characteristics such as culture, history and geography as similar as 
possible. Once I compiled this spreadsheet, I made a list of internal conflicts occurring 
post World War II expanded from Wanis-St. John and Kew’s (2008) analysis of 25 civil 

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war cases. I used their measure of civil society involvement to guide my thinking, but 
ultimately, the three cases I selected were not from their dataset. Nonetheless, 
preliminary research based upon Murdie’s (2009) cross-national index of international 
organizations indicated that Indonesian and the Philippines conflicts would present most 
likely tests of my theories, while Sri Lanka would be a harder test for my theory (George 
and Bennett 2005). As Indonesia and the Philippines have experienced multiple and 
simultaneous internal conflicts over their history as independent states, I chose the Aceh 
and Mindanao cases based upon similarities to each other and the Sinhalese-Tamil civil 
war in Sri Lanka. The civil war in Aceh and the Moro separatist movement in the 
Mindanao region of the Philippines are both, to some degree, Muslim-based separatist 
movements. The Aceh conflict and the Sri Lankan civil war were both dramatically 
impacted by the 2004 tsunami, but with diverging consequences. The tsunami is credited 
in Indonesia with serving as a catalyst for peace; however, relations between the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils are thought to have worsened in its wake (Gaillard et al 2008). 
The Tamil Tiger rebels and Moro separatists fight from a history of ethnic-based 
discrimination and prejudice while Indonesian repression in Aceh seems more related to 
protection and exploitation of Sumatra’s considerable natural resources than any of the 
unique cultural and religious characteristics of the Acehnese. Finally, both the Mindanao 
region and Tamil provinces experienced an influx of landless settlers from the majority 
ethnic group / religion in the lead up to the fighting (Orjuela 2003, Rood 2005).  
There are also similarities that appear across all three of the civil wars. First, most 
obviously, they are regionally quite close. All three are have experienced the legacies of 
colonialism under British (Sri Lanka), Dutch (Aceh) or Spanish (Philippines) rule. 


Geographically speaking, the Philippines and Indonesia are quite similar as each are 
comprised of a chain of islands. All of the conflicts formally commenced in the 1970s 
and lasted at least 30 years. Rebel combatants in all three conflicts obtain their weapons 
through similar means—arms smuggling routes running through Thailand, Cambodia and 
Malaysia (McBeth 2002). All three conflicts were mediated at different points in time by 
relatively impartial third parties, but the Aceh conflict is unique in that two different 
NGOs served as lead mediators during negotiations.  
This element makes the Aceh conflict stand out from other Indonesian conflicts 
(such as the East Timor separatist movement) because it presents an interesting test for 
my theory—if my theory is to have any weight at all, it is safe to assume that an NGO 
actually mediating a dispute presents quite an opportunity for Track II actors to shape the 
peace outcome. The sheer level of INGOs reported by Murdie (2009) presents another 
heuristic for expectations concerning how well my theory would hold up in a particular 
case. Give that I posit that continuous and sustained involvement from NGOs and civil 
society is crucial to a successful peace outcome, the more Track II actors there are to 
share the burden, the better. Initial perusal of the Sri Lankan case indicated that it would 
be a harder test, given the low numbers of INGOs reported by Murdie (2009) and the 
fewer third party attempts at conflict management.  
As required by a most similar research design, each conflict ended differently. 
The GAM (Free Aceh Movement) and Indonesian government signed a peace accord in 
2005 that currently remains in force. After signing a 1996 peace agreement with the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Philippines continues its struggle against 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayef rebels in the Mindanao region. 


The Sri Lankan government announced in late 2009 that it had defeated the Tamil Tiger 
separatist movement after 33 years of fighting. In the following chapter I will investigate 
the types and levels of NGO / civil society engagement through each process. I will then 
compare my findings in order to evaluate my hypotheses and suggest paths for further 
research. 

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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CASE STUDIES 
Aceh 
Aceh is located on the resource-rich island of Sumatra in Northern Indonesia. The 
Acehnese national identity reflects the religious and independent character developed 
during the province’s powerful days as seat to an Islamic empire during the 19th century 
(Uppsala 2008a). After Indonesian independence from the Netherlands in 1949, Aceh 
was established as a largely autonomous province. However, as the new state 
consolidated more and more aspects of governance, tensions arose (Large and Aguswandi 
2008). The region’s discontent was exacerbated by the arrival of oil and gas companies to 
transfer Aceh’s substantial resources (and profits) back to secular Jakarta. Finally, in 
1976, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)—Free Aceh Movement—launched an 
independence movement targeted mainly against Indonesian military (TNI) forces 
stationed in the province to protect ExxonMobil operations (Large and Aguswandi 2008). 
Far from a linear progression, the Aceh peace process has been punctuated by 
stalemates, reversals and exogenous shocks such as the 2004 tsunami. Unusually, two 
different NGOs have headed mediation efforts—the Henry Durant Center for 
Humanitarian Dialogue in the late 1990s and the Conflict Management Initiative  

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After the break down in a 2003 peace agreement. This case study traces the involvement 
of local and international NGOs and other civil society actors at each phase of the 
conflict. As I outlined in my research design, I systematically look for evidence of 
leverage over peace talks and cooperation among domestic and international groups. I 
also investigate other causal mechanisms and evaluate the significance of impact on 
peace outcomes that can be attributed to NGO and civil society activities.  
Peace Activities During Active Armed Hostilities 
After the outbreak of fighting in 1976, Government forces initially emerged 
triumphant amid tremendous human rights abuses in the “Military Operations Zones.” 
However, relying on arms smuggling routes from Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia, the 
GAM quietly rebuilt its forces to renew attacks in the early 1990s. During active 
hostilities and beyond, NGOs and other sectors of civil society have provided a diverse 
array of services to conflict-torn areas of Aceh, especially in regards to capacity-building, 
peace education, research and data gathering, and legal and non-legal advocacy 
(Askandar 2005). Examples of these groups include the Aceh Working Group—a 
coalition of peace and conflict resolution NGOs based in Jakarta, the Aceh Civil Society 
Task Force, the People’s Crisis Center, Save Aceh, the Coalition for Human Rights 
NGOs and Aceh media watch.  
Student-led protests in Banda Aceh proved successful in persuading the 
government to resume negotiations with the GAM in mid-2000 (Askandar 2005, Reid 
2000). Additionally, many groups set up shop in rural Aceh to offer humanitarian 
assistance and economic rehabilitation for Internally Displaces Persons (IDPs) 
(Lahdensuo 2010). For example, Flower Aceh provides skills training and family 

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planning education to rural women while promoting gender equality (Lahdensuo 2010). 
However, these NGOs have not operated in a space of respect and tolerance among the 
disputants. While the GAM committed human rights abuses in their own right, such as 
the targeting of schools (McBeth 2002), the TNI viewed NGOs as biased toward their 
enemy (Djalal 2001). As such, humanitarian aid workers frequently found themselves 
targeted by security forces (Djalal 2000). Methods of intimidation included raids on NGO 
offices, arrests and/or disappearances of activists (Askandar 2005). Less common, but 
exceptionally intimidating nonetheless were the murders of high-profile civil society 
leaders. For example, the heads of the two biggest universities in Aceh were assassinated 
(Askandar 2005). 
After several Danish NGO volunteers were murdered in broad daylight, INGOs 
such as Oxfam, Doctors without Borders and Save the Children pulled staff from Aceh 
and cancelled several programs (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). Between January 1999 and 
October 2001, the Aceh Coalition for Human Rights reported 75 cases of violence against 
NGO workers and student activists (Askandar 2005). During this time of intense conflict 
(worse than the height of TNI’s free rein in Military Operation Zones during the 1990s), 
many activists tried to work in exile—holding peacebuilding workshops in major cities 
across Southeast Asia (Askandar 2005, Aspinall and Crouch 2003).  
First Round of Peace Talks 
The first round of third party facilitation commenced in 1999 under the auspices 
of the Henri Durant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) (Huber 2008). This 
Swedish NGO was relatively new and the Aceh conflict represented its first attempt at 
facilitation (Huber 2008). Aspinall and Crouch (2003) outline the pros and cons of 

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HDC’s involvement. First, the support of the international community behind HDC’s 
efforts gave it leverage over the talks. However, its low profile ameliorated Indonesia’s 
concerns that internationalized talks would legitimize the GAM (Aspinall and Crouch 
2003). Darmi (2008) asserts that civil society organizations helped encourage the 
acceptance of mediation among a public skeptical that a small NGO could bring results. 
That said, the talks collapsed in 2003, no doubt in part due to HDC’s inexperience, 
limited local knowledge and small size (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). The key issue of the 
talks centered on whether the Acehnese should become entirely independent or remain 
part of the Indonesian state (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). The HDC’s strategy was one of 
distraction away from this seemingly irreconcilable question to focus on more practical 
matters such as ceasing hostilities, demobilization and reconstruction. Eventually, 
participation in these measures would inspire enough confidence between the disputants 
to broach final resolution of Acehnese autonomy (Aspinall and Crouch 2003).  
HDC achieved early success in its dialogue process through achievement of a 
Joint Understanding of Humanitarian Pause in May 2000. The purpose of the pause was 
twofold—to allow desperately needed humanitarian aid to reach Acehnese conflict 
victims and to prompt the confidence-building necessary for further negotiations between 
the government and GAM (Huber 2008). The Humanitarian Pause established a Joint 
Committee on Security Modalities (JCSM) to reduce tensions and violence; a Joint 
Committee of Humanitarian Action (JCHA) to coordinate distribution of funds for 
humanitarian development; and a Security Modalities Monitoring Team (SSMT) 
designed to evaluate implementation of the accord and investigate violations (Aspinall 
and Crouch 2003). These committees benefited immensely from their connections and 

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collaborations with NGOs and aid workers (Darmi 2008). For example, JCHA efforts 
were greatly aided through the NGO humanitarian volunteers network while the NGO 
human rights monitoring network “effectively became SMMT’s eyes and ears in the 
field” (Darmi 2008). However, NGOs and student activists sharply criticized committee 
structures for their lack of enforcement capacity and absence of mechanisms to punish 
violaters (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). These groups called upon international assistance 
to monitor the Pause, but, after allowing UN involvement in East Timor (a move 
perceived by Jakarta as facilitating their independence), the government sought to 
exclude international involvement in Aceh as much as possible (Aspinall and Crouch 
2003).  
Collapse of Talks and Resumption of Violence 
In July 2001, the new Indonesian president, Megawati, offered special autonomy 
for Aceh province (Huber 2008). The GAM rejected this offer and soon after, attacks on 
ExxonMobil gas facilities prompted Jakarta to withdraw from the pause and embark on 
security operations against GAM militants (Huber 2008). Attempting to bring the 
disputants back to official peace talks, the HDC used Megawati’s offer as a basis for 
further negotiations. However, as this was the government’s maximum offer and, at best, 
could be considered a minimum requirement for GAM acceptance, the HDC was limited 
to managing joint government and rebel committees throughout 2002 that focused on 
further implementation of the Pause and expanded humanitarian operations in Aceh 
(Huber 2008). One unintended consequence of these activities concerned gains in GAM’s 
international status. Another is that the Pause held throughout talks and gave the GAM a 
chance to rebuild (Huber 2008).  

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During this round of facilitated dialogue, the HDC arranged meetings between 
prominent Acehnese civil society leaders and GAM generals in Geneva (Aspinall and 
Crouch 2003). The first of these, held on August 19, 2002, was deemed a success after 
Imam Suja convinced the GAM to continue with the peace talks (Aspinall and Crouch 
2003, p. 30). Sensing the benefit of consultation with Acehnese civil society, the HDC 
announced it would pursue an All Inclusive Dialogue after an agreement was reached to 
find consensus on implementation and encourage public acceptance (Aspinall and Crouch 
2003). However, the TNI was quick to denounce the move (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). 
In December 2002, GAM and government leaders signed the Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement (CoHA) in Geneva (Huber 2008). According to the CoHA, the HDC would 
monitor implementation of the agreement alongside Indonesian security forces and GAM 
monitors while footing the bill and providing administrative and logistical support 
(Aspinall and Crouch 2003).  
The HDC reported that in the first two months of the agreement the average 
number of civilian deaths dropped from 87 to 12 (Aspinall and Crouch). Nine members 
of GAM were killed compared to 102 per month prior to CoHA’s signing while only four 
TNI troops lost their lives versus 45 per month (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). The 
reduction in violence and increases in freedom of movement were short-lived, however, 
after peace zones established by CoHA became launching pads for Acehnese 
independence rallies (Huber 2008). On May 18 2003, peace negotiations in Tokyo 
collapsed after the GAM rejected government demands for acceptance of autonomous 
status, immediate disarmament and abandonment of calls for independence (Aspinall and 
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Crouch 2003). Within hours, President Megawati declared “all out war” in the province 
and placed it under martial law (Aspinall and Crouch 2003).  
Round Two of Peace Talks in the Aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami 
Fighting raged until 2004 when Political Security Minister Yudhoyano secretly 
renewed a commitment to dialogue. He dispatched Vice President Kalla to contact GAM 
rebels in the field and exiled generals in Sweden (Huber 2008). Instead of turning again 
to the HDC, the Indonesian government called upon the services of Conflict Management 
Initiative—a Helsinki-based NGO led by Finland’s former president, Marti Ahtisaari 
(Huber 2008). Approximately two months after these back channel talks commenced, 
disaster struck. On December 26, 2004, a massive tsunami swept along the Acehnese 
coast, carrying away at least 165,000 people (Gaillard et al 2008). The army was in 
control of the coastal strip at the time and sustained severe damage (Gaillard et al 2008). 
Harris (2010) asserts that this loss prompted the TNI to declare a unilateral ceasefire 
towards GAM. Before the tsunami, two INGOs were working in Aceh; within weeks that 
number blossomed to over 500. The common theme of their activities centered upon 
“disaster diplomacy”—using the symbolism of NGO relief activities to emphasize the 
need for renewed talks (Gaillard et al 2008). That said, “much of the relief effort was 
conducted as if the conflict did not exist” in terms of who received care and attention and 
how much (Gaillard et al 2008, p. 517). Indeed, GAM and TNI forces focused their 
concern to relief activities, at times even cooperating with each other (Gaillard et al 
2008). As talks were secretly ongoing, the tsunami served as a powerful catalyst to the 
process, but not the sole determinant of the ensuing peace agreement (Gaillard et al 
2008).  

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In late January 2005, the first of five rounds of peace talks commenced in 
Helsinki. At first, President Ahtisaari spent his time shuttling between GAM and 
government leaders; however, over time the disputants were brought into the same room 
to speak face to face (Kingsbury 2006). Round one of the talks successfully delayed full 
on GAM acceptance of “special autonomy” and instead the parties agreed to “explore 
whether the ‘special autonomy’ concept could offer an opportunity to reach an end of the 
conflict” (Kingsbury 2006, p. 32). Round two of the peace talks kicked off to civil society 
criticism at the lack of transparency coming from Helsinki and questioning the legitimacy 
of the GAM to speak for all Acehnese (Kingsbury 2006). Recognizing the validity in 
these criticisms, the Olaf Palme International Center organized a series of meetings 
between GAM and civil society representatives, squelching criticism almost immediately 
(Kingsbury 2006). The first task assigned to civil society actors brought into the process 
was to “socialize” the term “self-government” among the Acehnese people and gauge 
whether it was more palatable than “special autonomy” (Kingsbury 2006, p. 45).  
Shortly before round three of peace talks, Kingsbury (2006, p. 64) (who does not 
pretend to offer an impartial account of his experiences during the Helsinki peace 
process) mentions that the HDC attempted to “wrest control” back from the CMI. 
Launching their own “Aceh Framework Agreement”, apparently HDC officials shopped 
their proposal around secretly between GAM and government officials. However, by this 
time, GAM had its own plan of action and, moreover, both parties had grown accustomed 
to meeting face to face, rending HDC’s style of shuttle diplomacy unnecessary. Round 
three additionally featured NGO activity outside the peace process in that the Support 
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Committee for Human Rights partnered with London-based Indonesian human rights 
organization, Tarpol, to hold a peacebuilding workshop in Jakarta (Kingsbury 2006).  
During round three, GAM officials selected civil society representatives to debrief 
on developments in the talks thus far and to outline their positions on independence, self-
government and democratization in Aceh (Kingsbury 2006). The secret meeting with 
civil society took place in Stockholm. Acehnese civil society leaders took the opportunity 
during their stay in Sweden to appeal to INGOs to condition reconstruction, rehabilitation 
and recovery funding upon a ceasefire (Askandar 2005).   
The discussion surrounding the establishment and character of local political 
parties during round four started off promising, but, under pressure from Jakarta, 
government negotiators returned to their hard-line position, threatening the survival of 
talks (Kingsbury 2006). On July 8, 2005, GAM officials hosted their second civil society 
meeting that included a number of participants who had been exceedingly critical of 
GAM activities. Kingsbury (2006, p. 110) notes: “A major concern was the lack of a 
referendum in the proposals being considered in the talks, this claim having been deleted 
early in the process as an impediment to the talks’ progress. There was also concern 
about the inclusion of wider social issues, including education, health and women’s 
rights. The issue of referendum was unable to be overcome…however, there could be 
support for such political expression in the future.”  
The final round of peace talks again got off to a good start with the issues of 
political parties settled to everyone’s relative satisfaction. However, the talks were nearly 
derailed at the last possible minute over Indonesia’s insistence on a larger than previous 
expressed contingent of TNI security forces remaining in Aceh (Kingsbury 2006). The 
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third and final meeting with Acehnese civil society was held on August 8, 2005 in 
Selangor, Malaysia. Over 230 individuals were in attendance as GAM officials 
encouraged them to promote acceptance of the agreement among the public (Kingsbury 
2006).  
The Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Helsinki on August 15, 2005. 
Most notably, it established a right to Aceh based political parties, reserved 70 percent of 
natural resources revenues for the province, declared amnesty for all GAM fighters and 
mandated the release of all political prisoners within 15 days. The agreement also 
established the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) composed of EU and ASEAN forces to 
monitor implementation of the MoU. The AMM was tasked with the following: a) 
monitor the demobilization of GAM and decommissioning of its armaments; b) monitor 
the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops, c) monitor 
the reintegration of active GAM members; d) monitor the human rights situation and 
provide assistance in this field; e) monitor the process of legislation change; f) rule on 
disputed amnesty cases, g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of 
the MoU, and h) establish and maintain liaisons and good cooperation with parties (MoU 
2005).  
Implementing the Memorandum of Understanding in Aceh 
Following the signing of the MoU, Acehnese civil society organizations 
facilitated public dialogues on sensitive issues, such as the potential fracturing of Aceh 
(Darmi 2008). Additionally, they attempted to frame spoilers of MoU as criminals subject 
to the rule of law rather than perpetrators of political violence whose activities cry out for 
retaliation (Darmi 2008). A few development based NGOs provided loans for ex-
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combatants to start their own businesses while others held job-training workshops. Darmi 
(2008) asserts that civil society played an integral role in drafting the Law on Governing 
of Aceh through public consultation forums and lobbying for a formal democratization 
agenda.  
Despite these measures of progress, Aspinall (2008) notes that civil society actors 
had little success in promoting human rights protections and sound mechanisms for 
transitional justice in the MoU. Initially pleased with the provisions establishing a human 
rights court and a truth and reconciliation commission, civil society in Aceh is now 
disappointed with its ineffectiveness (Aspinall 2008). Overall, the MoU allocates 
insufficient resources to human rights issues while the AMM practices excessive caution 
in human rights abuse investigations. Moreover, local NGOs believe their talents would 
be put to better use through capacity-building efforts and significant engagement on 
behalf of the AMM (Lahdensuo 2010). Not everyone finds the arrangement 
disappointing. Lahdensuo (2010) asserts that most civil society views the AMM very 
positively and as an impartial and professional actor. Indeed, two practitioners close to 
the negotiations argue that it is preferable that NGOs do not play a large part in the 
monitoring mission (Ahtisaari 2008, Feith 2007). Their reasoning for this is unclear, 
though perhaps it could be related to perceptions of bias among informal actors. In any 
case, the Aceh peace process represents a success story for Track II diplomacy and 
efforts at peacebuilding. That said, the analysis section following the three case studies 
will take into consideration alternative explanations for peace in Aceh, such as the 
involvement of strong international state actors and intergovernmental organizations.  

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Mindanao 
 In the 16th century, Spanish settlers landed in the Philippines islands and began a 
systematic campaign to colonize and convert indigenous peoples to the Spanish Crown 
and Catholicism, respectively (Uppsala 2008b). However, the Spanish could never quite 
quell the southern islands of the Mindanao region, nicknaming the ethnic groups their 
Moros after their religious arch-enemies in the Ottoman Empire (Uppsala 2008b). The 
Bangasmoros remained a distinct group from that first encounter with the West, through 
American imperial adventures and subsequent Philippine independence in 1946 (Uppsala 
2008b).  
Eager to get rid of potentially disruptive idle segments of the population, the 
newly created government encouraged migration to the south. This policy resulted in 
thousands of Christian settlers arriving in Mindanao per week, understandably triggering 
significant social conflict (Uppsala 2008b). The government put out these fires 
throughout the 1960s, but the murder of 28 Muslim recruits at the hands of Christian 
soldiers in 1968 proved too much for the long marginalized Muslim population to bear. 
The Mindanao Independence Movement quickly evolved into the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and by 1975, the civil war that would take at least 120,000 over 
its thirty-six year course and counting was well under way (Uppsala 2008b).  
The MNLF achieved initial political gains through the 1975 Tripoli Agreement. 
Under pressure from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), leaders for the 
MNLF accepted the Tripoli proposal establishing autonomy in 13 of 23 provinces 
(Uppsala 2008b). The agreement, while promising, failed to address other important 
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issues, such as land redistribution (Uppsala 2008b).3 Therefore, breakaway factions such 
as the MNLF-Reformist and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) resumed 
hostilities relatively quickly after the signing of the agreement.  
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the Mindanao conflict gained international 
prominence due to the widespread practice of kidnapping by insurgents, namely the Abu 
Sayef group (Uppsala 2008b). After President Ramos’ election in 1992, he renewed a 
commitment to dialogue with the MNLF (perceived as the most likely partner in peace) 
(Harris 2010). Indonesia, Libya and the OIC conducted meetings in Tripoli and, after four 
years of negotiations, MNLF and GRP officials signed the Agreement for the General 
Cessation of Hostilities (AGCH) on July 18, 1997 (Harris 2010). The MILF entered into 
negotiations with the GRP shortly after the AGCH signing; however, in 1999 the GRP 
launched an “all out war” against all Moro groups, prompting the MILF to leave peace 
talks (Harris 2010).   
By 2001, peace was once again on the table as President Estrada called upon 
Malaysia to serve as facilitator to the talks.4 With Malaysian persuading, the disputants 
formally recognized that their goals were not necessary incompatible in the 2001 Tripoli 
Agreement. Attempts to establish a Bangsamoro homeland without undermining 
Philippine sovereignty continued intermittently. Early 2003 saw heavy fighting after 
President Arroyo halted negotiations (due to MILF’s lukewarm appraisal of the GRP’s 
“Draft Final Peace Agreement). The conflict simmered in the latter half of that year, with 
 
3 For example, on the island of Basilan, 71 percent of the population is Muslim. However, Christians own 
75 percent of arable land while ethnic Chinese Filipinos control 75 percent of trade.  
4 Similar to mediation, “facilitation is closely associated with the ‘good offices’ concept in which a third 
party, acting with the consent of the disputing states serves as a friendly intermediary in an effort to induce 
them to negotiate between themselves without necessarily offering the disputing states substantive 
suggestions of settlement” (Harris 2010, p. 333, quoting Bledsoe and Bozcek 1987) 
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ceasefires holding for most of 2004. Arroyo asked Malaysia to increase their commitment 
to the talks by serving as mediator (Harris 2010). Attempts to define self-governance for 
the Mindanao region proved extremely problematic as disagreements arose over who and 
to what extent would have control over foreign affairs, defense and monetary policy 
(Harris 2010).  
Finally, the parties signed the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
(MoA-AD) on July 27, 2008. The MoA-AD defines the geographic extent of Moro 
homelands, allocation of natural resources and broadly outlines governance of the 
homeland (Harris 2010).5 In August 2008, however, Arroyo cancelled the MoA-AD amid 
civil society and Congressional outcry that the agreement conceded too much (Harris 
2010). Siding with the administration, the Supreme Court declared the agreement 
unconstitutional in October 2008 and talks once disintegrated (Harris 2010). Despite the 
MILF being the only active fighting force in the region at the time, violence reached its 
highest levels in five years (Harris 2010). In 2009, exhausted from the fighting, the MILF 
announced a unilateral ceasefire and returned to negotiations with the government. The 
Abu Sayef groups remains active; the conflict remains unresolved.  
Civil Society in the Mindanao Peace Process 
Rood (2005) describes civil society efforts throughout the Mindanao peace 
process as “hyperactive”, but disjointed. Cagoco-Guiam (1999) characterizes civil society 
as factionalized along religious and political groupings and mostly intra-communal—
serving on Muslim or Christian interests, with great difficulty (and little effort) in 
 
the MoA-AD states that: “The Parties agree that the BJE shall be empowered to build, develop, and 
maintain its own institutions, inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, 
legislation, legal, economic, and police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional 
institutions, necessary for developing a progressive Bangsamoro society, the details of which shall be 
discussed in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Compact” (2008).  

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transcending religious or ethnic bases (Rood 2005). Muslim groups are largely 
underrepresented; most civil society groups have a Christian affiliation of some sort 
(Harris 2010). Mincode, a caucus of Mindanao development NGOs reports a membership 
of over 500 organizations (Mincode 2011). However, regions with the greatest relative 
Muslim population report disproportionately small levels of NGO membership and 
activity (Rood 2005). Table 2 from Rood (2005, p. 10) illustrates this phenomenon:  
Table 2: Geographic Spread of Mindanao NGOs 
Location MinCODE Members 
Region 9 (Zamboanga peninsula) 65 
Region 10 (northern Mindanao) 189 
Region 11 (Davao area) 180 
Region 12 (western Mindanao) 38 
Region 13 (Caraga)  47 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(ARRM including Cotabato City) 
20 
Table directly from Rood’s (2005) survey of MinCODE members, p. 10 
 
As demonstrated in the collapse of the 2008 MoA-AD, civil society can have a 
powerful “spoiler” effect on negotiations between Moro separatists and the GRP. 
Declaring that “peace at any price is not worth it,” civil society groups did not commit 
violence against proponents of the peace process per se, but “provided the rationale and 
moral justification for such acts” (Barnes 2006, p. 20). Despite a “frantic” focus on 
interreligious dialogue, coalition building, community organizing and media advocacy, 
Rood (2005) asserts that civil society actors were given only a “token role” in the 1996 
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peace negotiations and beyond. Despite that, there are instances of success. For example, 
in November 2000, Mindanao Force—a coalition of NGOs, business councils, and 
elected public officials—urged then Vice President Arroyo to name an all-Mindanao 
peace panel for consultations with the MILF (Rood 2005). One month into her sudden 
presidential administration in February 2001, she did exactly that as part of her “all out 
peace policy” (Rood 2005, p. 7). The Mindanao Peace Panel included civil society 
representatives that were allowed to attend the July 2001 peace talks. They could not sit 
in on the actual negotiations, but were free to meet with officials during lunch and coffee 
breaks (Rood 2005). Unfortunately (but perhaps unsurprisingly), their presence had little 
effect on the discussions and failed to prevent the talks from collapsing. Also present 
were local government officials which, Arguillas (2003) reports, drowned out proposals 
from activists. GRP’s extensive reliance on back-channel negotiations during and after 
this round of negotiations with MILF further weakened the representatives’ bargaining 
power. However, despite these challenges the Mindanao Peace Panel is credited with 
helping to persuade the GRP to establish yet another ceasefire in August 2001. Activists 
also lobbied MILF officials to consider the civilian population when launching guerilla 
operations. In April 2002, civil society representatives convinced MILF leaders to 
abandon their use of landmines and sign the “Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call 
for Adherence to a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine 
Action” (Rood 2005). Landmines remain an ongoing issue in Mindanao—in June 2010, 
Brig. Gen. Jose Vizcarra announced that the “government and MILF teams will jointly 
move in tracking down and defusing landmines and unexploded devices to ensure that 
people in Central Mindanao will be out of harm’s way” (Wakefield 2010).  

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Nodes of civil society focused around religious groups, business councils, 
domestic and international INGOs and organizations dedicated to advancing gender 
equality during post-conflict reconstruction (Rood 2005). These groups interact with each 
other amid networks that are constantly shifting and realigning. These groups, while 
supporting the peace process in general, frequently clash with each other and with other 
nodes, unfortunately minimizing their impact on policy outcomes. For example, in terms 
of the big picture, “Akbayan believes in reform of the current system, Bayan Muna 
advocates complete replacement of the capitalist system, the MNLF aims for an ethno-
nationalist solution to Muslim problems, while the MILF seeks an Islamic solution” 
(Rood 2005, p. 14). As Rood (2005) illustrates, two of the main rebel groups in this case 
study—the MNLF and MILF—have NGO arms to advance their goals among the wider 
public. While this is perhaps inevitable, “one thing hindering civil society’s ability to 
influence governmental policymaking lies it is (real or alleged) political bias” (Rood 
2005, p. 34). It is this bias that makes NGOs a frequent target of Philippine government 
criticism or worse—harassment by security services. However, different nodes and types 
of activities receive greater tolerance from the government and citizenry alike than 
others.  
Given the Philippines colonial legacy, the Catholic Church plays the most active 
role in religious civil society, though other Christian denominations, particularly 
Mennonite conflict research organizations, engage in the peace process as well (Rood 
2005). Among these groups, Peace Advocates Zamboanga (PAZ) plays a big role in 
inter-religious dialogue and organizing peaceful protests. Rood (2005, p. 17) cites 
“poverty, discrimination, oppression and marginalization” as leading contributors to the 
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relatively weak state of Muslim civil society. These dynamics create feedback loops in 
which donors fund the established, bigger NGOs (which happen to be affiliated with 
Christianity) while Islamic societies struggle to bridge the funding gap. He also suggests 
that, within this segment of Mindanao’s population, there is a “lack of ideological space” 
for Muslim civil society groups. “To the extent that a shared identity as Muslims is strong 
(as the data indicate), then religion and armed struggle may fulfill the need for collective 
public action between the private sphere and the state in place of civil society 
organizations” (Rood 2005, p. 18). The Mindanao Business Council has attempted to 
create new avenues for inter-faith dialogue and understanding through partnerships with 
local imams. Recognizing the disproportionate impact of conflict on Muslim 
communities, the Council “has been actively working in such areas as halal food 
certification and Islamic banking” as a way for these areas to make a quick(er) recovery 
(Rood 2005).  
As previously alluded to, the NGO sector in Mindanao is perceived by both the 
citizenry and the government as biased and sympathetic to one cause or another. 
International NGOs such as Catholic Relief Services and Oxfam have invested a 
considerable amount in their domestic partners—far more than just providing funds, these 
NGOs are “involved in providing training, preparing training materials, conducting 
workshops, etc.” (Iyer 2004, p. 5).  
Santiago (2011) provides an overview of “gender equality” NGOs operating in 
Mindanao. The GRP was the first country in Asia to develop a “National Action Plan” to 
implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 addressing the unique 
impacts of armed conflict and sexual violence on women. Additionally, the MILF 
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announced that they would soon include two female advisors on their panel for peace 
negotiations (Santiago 2011). Encouraged, women in Mindanao have formed the “We act 
for 1325” network and, in character with overlapping civil society nodes, the “Mindanao 
1325” network (Santiago 2011).  
Civil Society Activities—Interfaith Dialogue, Peace Zones, and Monitoring Ceasefires 
Since the late 1970s, the National Council of Churches as well as Catholic NGOs 
have attempted to downplay the national label for the Philippines as the “only Christian 
Country in Asia” in favor of recognizing the sizable Islamic population in Mindanao 
(Rood 2005, p. 21). In 1992 the GRP created the National Unification Commission 
(NUC). This institution encouraged several locally organized workshops and meetings to 
bring Christians and Muslims together under one roof. The strict hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church contrasted with the decentralized character of Islam has made for 
differences in levels of representation during interreligious dialogue. Rood (2005, p. 23) 
asserts that, given most Christians self-segregation from Muslim communities, “to the 
extent that one hopes to change attitudes, it is Christian attitudes that must change.” 
Finally, while the aims of interreligious dialogue are noble and definitely supportive of a 
long-term peace, in the short term, the meetings fail to address alternative (but highly 
relevant) secular separatist movement in Mindanao.  
Another church-led area of peacebuilding concerns the establishment of “peace 
zones” throughout the Mindanao region. During various periods of hostilities, local 
communities, with the help of a regional bishop (or NGO official), drafted agreements to 
present to the GRP and rebel forces, asserting their right to a peaceful existence within set 
territorial bounds (Iyer 2004). Jumping on board, the GRP established the Special Zone 
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for Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in the 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF. 
However, President Estrada angered civil society organizations when he converted the 
peace zones into forced depositories for people internally displaced by the fighting (Iyer 
2004). Local representatives worked to distance themselves from these government-run 
peace zones and keep the process as bottom-up and connected to individual communities 
as possible (Iyer 2004). In terms of success of these agreements, the results are mixed. In 
some circumstances, the zones of peace has conceivably prevented conflict as they give 
some space to sort out individual instances of violence—whether they were related to 
MILF / MNLF activities or feuds between families (obviously stemming from different 
motivations, but, in the past, the latter was frequently conflated to the level of separatist 
activities by GRP security forces) (Rood 2005, Iyer 2004). During fighting between GRP 
and Moro separatists, it appears that the combatants have taken some care to respect their 
agreement with communities (given that both, but especially MNLF and MILF forces, 
have an interest in being perceived as “honorable” or “the good guys” among the public) 
(Iyer 2004, p. 40). However, when strategic or tactical challenges conflicted with their 
obligations under the agreement or the violence escalated nearby--like near the Nalapaan 
Space for Peace in Pikit in 2003, for example—the agreement failed to keep war out. For 
the fourth time (Iyer 2004, Rood 2005). As with the interreligious dialogues, however, 
there is considerable evidence suggesting that zones for peace support long-term peace. 
Both Rood (2005) and Iyer (2004) find that, within these zones, citizens report higher 
levels of trust among themselves as well as outside communities. Additionally, the 
periods of peace have allowed space for economic development—as Rood (2005) 
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documents a jubilant café owner proclaiming that his coffee shop remained at capacity 
throughout the night after the zones of peace agreement was signed.  
Providing similar benefits as the locally established peace zones, but with 
(sometimes) regional security have been the periodic ceasefires throughout the Mindanao 
conflict. Somewhat surprisingly, NGOs and other civil society actors have played a big 
role in monitoring these agreements and reporting violations. These groups were involved 
in the drafting and implementation of Local Monitoring Teams. When those groups failed 
to disclose the results of their monitoring, NGOs such as Bantay Ceasefire stepped in 
with transparent reporting of their own, independent, investigations (Rood 2005). Again, 
as with the peace zones, NGO monitoring has played an integral role in distinguishing 
organized violence from familial clashes, thereby preventing the collapse of ceasefires at 
certain times (Rood 2005).  
Despite these efforts, civil society organizations have had little to no effect on 
public opinion, which largely is opposed to autonomy for Mindanao (Rood 2005). With 
elites, they have had a little more luck in advocating for specific policy proposals; 
however, general calls for peace are usually overshadowed by strategic or self-interested 
considerations of elected officials and rebel group leaders. One reason why these groups 
might be so frequently stymied concerns their poor relationship with media outlets in the 
Philippines. Journalistic accounts of the Mindanao conflict tend to be quite conservative 
and rarely report on civil society perspectives of a particular event (Cagoco-Guiam 
1999). As several of the groups covered in this case study (Mindanao 1325, Mindanao 
Business Council) have Facebook accounts, there is hope that technological advances in 
communications will help these groups target their message to the public.  

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Sri Lanka 
 Amid Sri Lanka’s independence from British colonial rule in 1948, the Tamil 
ethnic group to the country’s north and east worried that they would be second class 
citizens in the new state (Uppsala 2008c). The Tamils had a few years respite as the 
Sinhalese worked on consolidating power in the new state, but by 1972, they were 
comfortable and confident enough in their status as the majority ethnic group to declare 
Sinhala the official language and Buddhism the official state language of Sri Lanka. 
Naturally, this did not sit well with the Tamils—who already had difficulties getting a job 
or education in Colombo (Uppsala 2008c). In May 1976, early leaders of the separatist 
released the Vaddukoddai Resolution. This manifesto declared the northern and eastern 
provinces of Sri Lanka to be the separate state of Tamil Eelam and established the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to bring this independence movement to 
fruition (Uppsala 2008c). Up to 100,000 people were killed in the ensuring 33 year civil 
war.  
 The early stages of fighting featured a plethora of fragmented rebel groups, but 
infighting quickly resulting in the LTTE emerging as the torchbearer for the Tamil 
independence movement. With support from the Tamil-led state of Tamil Nadu in India, 
the LTTE became one of the world’s most formidable guerilla armies (Uppsala 2008c). 
The group had the capacity to wage conventional warfare from its own small air force 
and navy in addition to the traditional guerilla fighting tactics characteristic of most 
modern civil wars (Harrison 2002). Perhaps the most incredible feature of the LTTE was 
the existence of their super elite fighting units, the Black Tigers. The Black Tigers 
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purportedly launched over 300 suicide missions, several of which achieved their military 
goals in catching Sri Lankan forces unaware while at their base (Harrison 2002).  
In addition to the organizational capacity and support for suicide cadres, another 
highly unique feature of the Tamil Tigers concerns their use of female combatants. 
Women make up approximately thirty percent of LTTE forces, including the Black Tiger 
units (Gunawardena 2006). The move to include female fighters began in the late 1980s, 
more due to operational necessity than any loftier aspirations for gender equality or 
support for feminism. Even among the female fighters themselves, it appears they are 
driven from ideological, nationalist and personal motivations more so than a desire for 
complete equality with men (Gunawardena 2006). While Gunawardena (2006) cites 
widespread rape of Tamil women during fighting in the late 1980s / early 1990s (during 
the Indian Peacekeeping Mission) as a contributing factor in their increasing militancy, 
she maintains that there is a little evidence linking rape as a tool of war to the decision of 
women to embark on suicide missions for the Tamil cause.  
India, long sympathetic to demands for Tamil independence, facilitated the 1987 
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord that granted more autonomy to the northern and eastern provinces 
in exchange for LTTE demobilization and demilitarization (Marasinghe 1988). India 
offered to provide a peacekeeping force to support and protect the LTTE during 
disarmament; however, the Tigers, not fully comfortable the terms of the agreement, soon 
turned on the Peacekeeping forces (Uppsala 2008c). Unfortunately for the Tigers, taking 
on both the Sri Lankan and Indian forces at the same time proved too much to handle and 
by 1989, LTTE leaders accepted a ceasefire and promised to give up their guns and 
transform into a political party. The promise to enter politics was not a lie per se, but the 
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manifestation of this was surely not what the Sri Lankan government had in mind. In 
1990, Tiger rebels launched the Second Eelam War and quickly secured the entire Jaffna 
peninsula (Uppsala 2008c). The People’s Front of Liberation Tigers, the Tiger’s 
“political party”, provided public service and essentially converted the peninsula into a de 
facto state until 1995.  
Fighting continued until 1994, when the parties returned to the negotiating table 
and established a ceasefire. Talks stalemated though and, in retaliation, LTTE naval 
forces ambushed Sri Lankan navy boats, destroying the ceasefire before it even had a 
chance to get off the ground (Uppsala 2008c). This phase of the fighting, known as the 
Third Eelam War, comprised the most violent phase of the conflict. The government 
adopted a harsh “war for peace” strategy and finally retook Jaffna is 1996.  
By 2000, the Tigers once again found themselves on the ropes and declared a 
unilateral ceasefire. Sri Lankan forces continued fighting, but secretly reached out to 
Norway to facilitate talks. Norway delivered a Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement 
in 2002 and convinced the LTTE to accept autonomy rather than full independence. The 
CoH established the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission comprised of Norwegian, Swedish, 
Finnish, Danish and Icelandic monitors. After years of criticism as being simultaneously 
too close to Tamil Forces and biased against them, the SMM closed its doors in 2008 (by 
that point a whisper of its former monitoring capabilities) (Secretariat for Coordinating 
the Peace Process 2010). Similarly, the CoH was not to last; however, as the Tigers 
accused the government of delaying reconstruction efforts in the Tamil provinces. The 
tsunami further deteriorated relations; unlike Aceh, the tidal wave disproportionately hurt 
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Tamil rebels instead of military forces and the relief effort was uncoordinated and, in 
some instances, counterproductive (Gaillard et al 2008; Harris 2006).  
The Fourth Eelam War of 2006 involved extensive use of Claymore mines against 
soldiers patrolling the Tamil provinces and indiscriminate civilian targets (including 
several children) in Colombo and surrounding countryside (Integrated Regional 
Information Networks 2008). The Sri Lankan government banned journalists from the 
country and frequently criticized international humanitarian organizations, thereby 
obfuscating the extent of repression and civilian casualties from the international 
community (Uppsala 2008c). Norway unsuccessfully attempted to arrange talks in 
Geneva in July 2006, but relations were so poor between the combatants that the 
meetings never came to fruition (Uppsala 2008c). In April 2009, the Sri Lankan 
government rescinded its consent to Norway serving as a facilitator for talks after the 
Norwegians arranged a phone call between a Tiger military operative and a humanitarian 
aid organization seeking access to northern Sri Lanka (Agencies 2009). Less than a 
month later the fight was over for the Tamil independence movement—President 
Mahinda Rajapakse declared the end of the civil war on May 19, 2009 and twenty four 
hours later, the LTTE admitted defeat in acknowledging the death of their founder, 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran (Thottam 2009).   
Civil Society in the Sri Lankan Peace Process 
“In Sri Lanka we don’t have civil society, only uncivil society” (Orjuela 2003, p. 
199). Orjuela (2003) claims that she frequently hears this phase during interviews with 
Sri Lankan activists and intellectuals. She attributes this to the extreme polarization of Sri 
Lankan society between the Sinhalese and Tamils. Like the Mindanao conflict, the 
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composition of Sri Lankan civil society is lopsided in favor of the majority group. 
Sinhalese nationalist and Buddhist groups serve as spoilers to the peace process due to 
their frequent protest activities and avid support of the military campaign to suppress the 
Tamil independence movement (Orejuela 2003). There is a extreme dearth of groups 
devoted to transcending ethnic boundaries. Furthermore, INGOs make up a substantial 
part of Sri Lankan civil society—while this is not necessarily negative, in Sri Lanka, 
Orejuela (2003) asserts that their presence reinforces citizen passivity. The authoritarian 
culture / prevailing government structures of Sri Lanka influence the daily operations of 
INGOs (generally more bureaucratic organizations than their grassroots counterparts 
anyway) and the few local NGOs (Orjuela 2003).  The history and prevalence of top-
down rule leaves little room for a sense of agency at the individual level as a Tamil 
activist living in Jaffna reports: “LTTE people prepare to go for war; we can’t do 
anything about that. We give our opinion about peace. But we don’t say ‘Stop the War’” 
(Orejuela 2003, p. 200). The obstacles facing Tamil civil society are legion. The Sri 
Lankan government views Tamil activism with suspicion, extreme feelings of distrust of 
the Tamil people characterize Sinhalese perceptions, and, finally, the Tigers themselves 
frequently stamp out alternative opinions as they claim to represent the will of the Tamils 
alone (Orejuela 2003).  
Despite these forces operating against a vibrant civil society, a small contingency 
of peacebuilding groups have gained a foothold in the debate (Orejuela 2003). A civil 
society rally marking International Human Rights Day in 1994 drew over 40 NGOs and 
thoughts and activists to the streets of Colombo (Orejuela 2003). Leaders compiled 
appeals for peace that were later sent to the government and LTTE officials. In February 
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1995, the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka launched its inaugural meeting. The 
umbrella group of peace and conflict resolution organizations focused on training and 
advocacy and ignited a growing interest in peace work among local groups. However, 
support withered with repeated collapses in peace talks during the late 1990s—most civil 
society groups, Orejuela (2003) reports, supported the government’s subsequent “war for 
peace” strategy. Consequently, it appears civil society groups took a step back and shifted 
their focus to building trust and understanding between the Sinhalese and Tamil peoples 
(Orejuela 2003). For example, in 2001 the Center for the Performing Arts in Jaffna 
brought a troupe of Sinhalese performers to the peninsula for performances and training 
workshops for Tamil dancers. Other groups brought Sinhalese women to camps for 
internally displaced Tamils; interviews suggest that seeing the conditions first hand and 
talking with the victims of conflict made a powerful impression (Orejuela 2003). 
Orejuela (2003) asserts that these activities had a tangible impact—following LTTE 
attacks on Sinhalese civilians in a village just east of a Tamil province, citizens refrained 
from indiscriminate retaliation; a shift from past reactions to similar attacks.  
Civil society actors, most notably a Christian group that held an influential Round 
Table Conference in 1983, also attempted to push elites for the resumption of 
negotiations, constitutional reforms allowing for some degree of Tamil autonomy as well 
as democratic changes within the central government (Bastian 1999; Orejuela 2003). 
These actors, however, were working against the constraints of Sinhalese nationalist 
parties that had frequently served as spoilers to previous attempts at achieving peace. 
Bastian (1999, p. 33) notes that “the other central concern [of these groups, in addition to 
pushing for peace and respect for human rights] was the work at the ideological level 
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which questioned some of the dominant myths of Sinhala nationalism.” However, this 
challenge was very quickly put down by Sinhalese nationalist civil society groups and the 
media, which declared the critical questions “a conspiracy to undermine the Sinhala 
nation” (Bastian 1999, p. 33).  
While the Sri Lankan conflict never captured the attention of the international 
community held by other conflicts of greater geopolitical value (from a cynic’s 
perspective), Bastian (1999) argues that the high point (at least until the 2004 tsunami) of 
international involvement occurred between 1983 and 1987 (during the Indian 
Peacekeeping Force period). During this time, the UN Commission on Human Rights 
passed several resolutions against the Sri Lankan government, but this condemnation did 
not translate into greater international legitimacy for the Tigers or Tamil aims (Bastian 
1999). The UN Development Program (UNDP) worked to subcontract projects to local 
civil society organizations (Desilva and Ramiah 2007). Towards the latter years of the 
conflict, the UNDP established District Review Boards comprised of UNDP officials, 
local civil society representatives and NGOs to discuss and develop UNDP projects in 
that district (Desilva and Ramiah 2007). Harris and Lewer (2002) document Oxfam’s 
attempts at engagement with local civil society and domestic development NGOs through 
their “Relationship Building Programme.” They note that the establishment of this 
program marked a shift in Oxfam’s integration of development and peacebuilding. 
Previously, Oxfam had engaged mostly through international lobbying on behalf of its 
local partners—pushing for international campaigns and agreements against the use of 
landmines in warfare, for example (Harris and Lewer 1999, p. 6). The early days of 
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Oxfam’s experiment in Sri Lanka were labeled as the “Conflict Reduction Programme”6 
and focused on three objectives: 1) improving the conflict reduction and peacebuilding 
skills of local organizations and average citizens, 2) fostering greater trust and 
understanding among and between communities and ethnic groups; and 3) supporting 
policy changes within the national government that contribute to reduced conflict and a 
sustainable peace. Similar to the UNDP approach, Oxfam established District Advisory 
Groups to work on using development projects to support peacebuilding activities. 
Additionally, the INGO produced a documentary covering their efforts—a rare attempt at 
changing widely held negative perceptions of both peace and international organizations 
within media outlets (Harris and Lewer 2002).  
Mitigating the impact of Oxfam and other similarly minded INGO efforts are the 
anti-NGO sentiments that prevail among public and elite perceptions of the peace 
process; Peace Brigades International reports that three thousand protesters descended 
upon the NGO Forum on Sri Lanka in 1995 with the intent to disrupt the conference 
(Peace Brigades International 1995). These attitudes even extend past the end of the civil 
war. In March 2011, the Sri Lankan government announced it was launching an 
“investigation into the funding sources of the National Peace Council” (Asian Human 
Rights Commission 2011). The government appeared mystified that the National Peace 
Council would need to continue operations since the war was “over.” Countering the 
government’s bewilderment at the necessity of operations “serving the interests of 
foreign powers”, the National Peace Council noted the complete lack of reconciliation 
 
6 The program was later relabeled the “Relationship Building Programme” because the phrase “conflict 
reduction” was deemed too contentious for the Sinhalese public that a) supported government efforts at 
eradicating “Tamil terrorists” and b) were extremely suspicious of INGO operations, deeming their 
activities “foreign meddling” that warranted attacks, such as 2001 grenade attacks on Save the Children and 
Oxfam offices (Harris and Lewer 2002, p. 9). 

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measures in the northern provinces after 2009 (Perera 2011). The National Peace Council 
reported its concern at the neglect of reconciliation as recently as June 2011, warning that 
“the ghost of the LTTE” could yet haunt the government (Perera 2011).  
Impact of Civil Society Involvement 
Overall, Orejuela (2003) argues that these types of peace and trust building 
activities have been too small scale and infrequent to have a significant impact on the 
peace process in Sri Lanka. Society on the island has been so decimated by the 
consequences of war that among average citizens the focus must be on day to day 
survival rather than aspirations for a goal as lofty as peace. Orejuela (2003) reports that 
groups frequently provided lunch and transportation in order to increase attendance at 
peace events. The absence of democratic structures among domestic and international 
NGOs leaves little hope for accountability and transparency to ensure that limited 
resources are spent efficiently. Finally, public opinion polling suggests that a deep gap in 
understanding “the other” exists among both the Sinhalese and Tamils (Orejuela 2003). 
In terms of cooperation with international organizations, these partnerships flourished 
after the 2004 tsunami, but, unlike Aceh, the relief effort in Sri Lanka was uncoordinated 
and unevenly distributed, again mitigating the impact of Track II efforts (Harris 2006). 
Harris (2006) asserts that NGO efforts in the wake of the 2004 tsunami “congested” 
space for effective humanitarian assistance, let alone engage in “disaster diplomacy” as 
Gaillard et al (2008) reports occurred in Aceh. By the end of January 2004, more than 
300 INGOs were in operation along the Sri Lankan coastline (including the 75 
organizations were that were working in the country prior to the tsunami) (Harris 2006). 
Unfortunately, less than half of those organizations registered with the government’s 

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Centre for National Operations Coordination Center, though, given the government’s 
prior hostility to international organizations, this is perhaps understandable (Harris 2006). 
Consequently, however, aid shipments flown in on a daily basis disappeared from the 
airport’s tarmac without record of where it was being delivered and by whom. INGOs 
proved eager to find local groups to serve as distribution networks for aid. The influx of 
money and resources meant that little consideration was given to the track record of local 
organizations, instead groups were pressured to take the resources, whether they could 
use them or not. As one local director reported: “We are forced to accept funds we don’t 
have the capacity to utilize because if we refuse we will lose face [with their beneficiary 
constituency] and other local NGOs will take both the money and our people anyway” 
(Harris 2006, p. 5).  
Despite being flush with money and aid shipments, age-old rivalries over 
territory, partners and projects divided the NGO community and distracted the operations 
from recognizing the peacebuilding potential in the wake of the disaster (Gaillard et al 
2008). In other situations, Harris (2006) reports that the aid given was actually 
counterproductive to alleviating the humanitarian crisis that prompted the donation in the 
first place. For example,  the Government of Taiwan offered 50,000 tons of rice to Sri 
Lanka, despite the fact that tsunami affected areas, fortunately, did not face food security 
issues. The influx of free rice threatened to dampen prices Sri Lankan farmers received at 
market, thereby making it harder for them to repay loans taken out on their harvest. When 
asked if Sri Lanka should politely reject Taiwan’s sincere or self-interested offer, an 
official affiliated with the relief effort replied, “No, at times like these we cannot afford 
to look a gift horse in the mouth” (Harris 2006, p. 3). The Sri Lankan case of post-
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tsunami humanitarian relief serves as a sharp warning to international NGOs and bilateral 
donors to adopt “conflict awareness” procedures for the next natural disaster, but, 
unfortunately, for the Sri Lankan-Tamil peace process, the relief dividend delivered to the 
Aceh negotiations never transpired (Gaillard et al 2008). 
 

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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
ANALYSIS  
The Aceh, Mindanao and Sri Lankan conflicts illuminate the role civil society and 
NGOs can play in shaping (and spoiling) prospects for a sustainable peace. Additionally, 
process tracing each conflict has shown how these actors interact with other important 
catalysts and constraints for the peace process. For example, the level of attention and 
commitment by the international community serves as an alternative explanation for civil 
war outcomes; however, comparing international responses to Aceh and Sri Lanka after 
the 2004 tsunami demonstrates how domestic and international NGOs and other civil 
society actors also fit within this explanation. Together, the three investigations provide 
some answers for my hypotheses, despite the somewhat limited generalizability of these 
findings. Furthermore, it is useful to depict and compare patterns of civil society 
involvement during each phase of conflict. Comparing levels and patterns of engagement 
provides a framework for an indexed measure of civil society engagement that could 
eventually be used for quantitative examinations of the research questions posed in this 
thesis. Finally, comparative analysis and evaluation of my hypotheses yield paths for both 
additional research and practical application. 
Several of my hypotheses center around the expected impact of “higher levels of 
domestic and INGO involvement” in the peace process. From my qualitative 

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investigation, I have concluded that both the Aceh and Mindanao conflicts represent high 
levels of Track II engagement in the peace process, based upon sheer frequency and 
varying types of activities that domestic and INGOs have coordinated. The Sri Lankan 
civil war represents a low level of NGO engagement. Orjuela’s (2003, p. 200) interviews 
capture the depressed sense of individual agency among civil society activists: “…We 
give our opinion about peace, but we don’t say ‘Stop the War.’”While Aceh and 
Mindanao experienced high levels of NGO engagement in the peace process, the 
experiences (and impact) of activists differed considerably. The Mindanao conflict is 
plagued by a fractured civil society. These groups, while highly active, often run counter 
to one another’s goals, thereby cancelling the other’s impact. Additionally, from my 
investigation, it appears the Mindanao conflict received less international attention than 
the Aceh conflict. This, I argue, is a function of two unique characteristics of the Aceh 
conflict. First, most obviously, the devastation of the 2004 tsunami captured the world’s 
attention and motivated a sustained INGO relief effort. Those groups then transferred 
support for disaster relief to diplomatic pressure to resolve the conflict. Second, even 
before the tsunami, GAM leaders embarked on a sustained effort to gain international 
recognition and legitimacy. Part of the reason why the Indonesian government agreed to 
let the HDC and CMI mediate their dispute was to avoid conferring greater international 
legitimacy to the GAM. Tables 4, 5, and 6 provide a visual illustration of the varying 
degrees of NGO activities in each dispute. Those Tables will be discussed in detail  
I

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during the evaluation of hypothesis six (expectations about the timing of domestic and INGO 
intervention and impact of sustained NGO engagement in the peace process).  
It is prudent to make sure that my theory concerning the ways in which NGOs gain 
leverage in peace negotiations holds up to the empirical record. Only then can evaluate each 
individual hypothesis. Through my qualitative investigation, it appears that international actors 
frequently rely on NGOs to report from the field on the status of the peace agreement, human 
rights violations, etc. However, this unique capability of local actors does not always translate 
into greater credibility or influence among Track II actors in other issue areas. One exception to 
this general trend would be the coordinate NGO response in Aceh to engage in “disaster 
diplomacy” and urge the peace talks forward (Gaillard et al 2008). However, while civil society 
actors played an instrumental role in monitoring ceasefires between GRP and Moro separatists in 
the Philippines, their activities and influence in this capacity did little to advance their standing 
among a public in firm opposition to peacebuilding activities. 
In terms of providing a voice to the wars’ most affected citizens, NGOs played a strong 
role in this regard and used these narratives to advance specific policy proposals, such as 
Oxfam’s lobbying for landmine bans. These connections to local populations have helped Track 
II organizers mobilize the international community and domestic society, with an important 
caveat: public opinion is a powerful constraint on the effectiveness of peace protests and rallies. 
For example, the burgeoning peace movement in Sri Lanka was squashed following a swift 
reversal in public opinion towards support for the government’s “war for peace” strategy. While 
NGO and civil society leaders can have influence, it is fragile—public opinion is quite resilient 
to change in both the Mindanao and Sri Lankan conflicts. While Sri Lankan civil society 
peacebuilding efforts are dominated by a top-down approach, Philippines Track II actors have 

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embraced grassroots organizing. This trend is most apparent in the establishment of Peace Zones. 
While the zones of peace have been frequently overrun by combatants in times of collapsed talks 
or intense fighting, the sense that Philippine citizens can declare their village a conflict-free zone 
represents a huge difference in mentality between Mindanao and Sri Lankan citizens. This 
greater sense of individual agency, I argue, has encouraged Philippines civil society to continue 
peacebuilding efforts, despite numerous setbacks. By contrast, the collapsed peace movement in 
Sri Lanka in the late 1990s never quite recovered. In conclusion, I found strong evidence for the 
theoretical underpinnings of my hypotheses; however, it is prudent to recognize the limits of 
influence these actors have in the peace process—an active, strong role in one arena does not 
always translate into greater influence across the entire peace process. Table 2 briefly indicates 
the level of support found for my six hypotheses. I elaborate on the results below.  
Table 3: Support for Hypotheses 
H1 
 
Some Support 
H2 Some Support 
H3 Undetermined / No Support 
H4 Some Support 
H5 Strong Support 
H6 Strong Support 
 
H1: Conflict Management attempts in states with higher levels of domestic and INGO 
involvement (D / INGO) will be more likely to end in a partial or full peace agreement than in 
states with low levels of Track II involvement. 

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I find support for my first hypothesis, but with a few additional conditions. First, as the 
Mindanao case in particular illustrates, it is not enough to have high levels of civil society 
involvement. The civil society must actually be a) civil and b) representative. After all, several 
civil society organizations urged the Supreme Court to declare the 2008 peace agreement 
unconstitutional because “peace at any price is not worth it”—meaning that the agreement ceded 
too much autonomy to the Mindanao provinces. The underrepresentation of Muslims and 
complete absence of Lumads (non-Muslims indigenous to the Mindanao region) bears ill for 
peacebuilding efforts. Christian organizations are tasked with either serving their own interests 
or attempting to reach out to other faiths, but without a clear understanding of how to bridge the 
gap among communities. Likewise, in Sri Lanka, Sinhalese nationalist groups have on several 
occasions spoiled attempts at peacebuilding and outreach to the Tamils in the north. Coordinated 
international involvement is also important to the peace process, as the facilitation of talks 
between GAM and civil society representatives by the Olaf Palme International Center 
illustrates.  
The Aceh case meets these conditions and also features the unique characteristic of 
INGO mediators. The motivations behind HDC and CMI involvement in the conflict differ from 
those found within the literature (better suited to foster a peace agreement that is sustained, etc.). 
In this case, it appears that the HDC and CMI were brought in by the Indonesian government to 
minimize the risk of GAM officials gaining even more international legitimacy (Aspinall 2007, 
Kingsbury 2006). Second, lingering resentment towards UN involvement in the East Timor 
conflict excluded that organization as a possibility to mediate peace negotiations. While the HDC 
and CMI deferred to the wishes of the combatants about the role of civil society involvement in 
the meetings, the activists were lucky to have a friend in GAM officials (Kingsbury 2006). The 

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INGO mediators facilitated talks between GAM leaders and activists, but did not push the 
combatants to allow activists into the negotiations (Kingsbury 2006). However, this coordinated 
effort to make their demands known yielded returns, such as when Imam Suja convinced GAM 
officials to continue with peace talks (Kingsbury 2006). By contrast, civil society involvement in 
Mindanao peace negotiations was limited to access to officials during lunch and coffee breaks. 
This uncoordinated, informal approach, combined with the extensive use of backchannel 
negotiations between MILF and GRP officials, mitigated any impact civil society activists had 
on the talks (Rood 2005).  
H2: Peace agreements signed in states with higher levels of D / INGO involvement will 
be more likely to endure that peace agreements signed in states with lower levels of D / INGO 
involvement. 
As a brief evaluation of peace agreement endurance in each conflict, I find that the 2005 
Memorandum of Understanding in Aceh is an enduring peace agreement, as is the 1997 General 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF (though 
that agreement failed to resolve the Mindanao conflict). Sri Lanka did not experience any 
enduring ceasefires or peace agreements before the Tamil Tigers’ defeat in 2009.  
I find support for this hypothesis with the conditions outlined in my discussion of 
hypothesis one and the introduction of a third: security guarantees. The Aceh case illustrates that 
the backing of the international community is a powerful component explaining the durability of 
a peace agreement. Non-state actors can complement this support from strong states and 
international organizations; however, there appears to be no substitute for Walter’s (2002) “third 
party security guarantees.” I argue that the Philippines ceasefires have been greatly aided by 
local NGO monitors, which minimizes the vulnerability of MILF forces to abide by the 

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agreements. However, their involvement has not been sufficient to prevent the breakdown of the 
agreement during tense and stalled negotiations.  
H3: Peace agreements signed in states with higher levels of D / INGO involvement will 
be more likely to include institutions such as transitional justice mechanisms, power-sharing 
pacts, and specific protections for human rights than peace agreements signed in states with 
lower levels of D / INGO involvement.  
I do not find support for this hypothesis. However, through my case selection, I 
ultimately relied upon an n of 1 to evaluate this hypothesis, so further testing is sorely needed.  
The Aceh-Indonesia case featured relatively high levels of civil society involvement (through 
meetings with GAM representatives) and yet the final Memorandum of Understanding was quite 
weak on human rights and transitional justice institutions (Aspinall 2008). This finding could be 
an outlier given the apparent satisfaction with vague human rights language in the MoU at the 
time of the signing. That is to say, I found little evidence that Acehnese civil society pushed 
ardently for strenuous human rights provisions—their main focus instead seemed to be reaching 
a sustainable peace agreement granting significant autonomy to the Acehnese people (Kingsbury 
2006). Kingsbury (2006) relays discussions about post-conflict power-sharing between GAM 
and government officials; however, civil society appears to have been completely excluded from 
these negotiations (as they took place in the frantic hours just before an agreement was officially 
reached). I found little evidence of civil society representatives pushing for transitional justice 
institutions and no institutions were firmly established in the 2005 Memorandum of 
Understanding, besides a vague reference to the establishment of a Human Rights Court that, as 
of the time of this writing, has yet to come into being. Furthermore, it is difficult to compare the 
Acehnese MoU with Cessation of Hostilities agreements signed at various points in the 
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Philippines and Sri Lankan conflicts since such a huge contingency of those civil societies are 
against peace in the first place, leaving them little incentive to advocate for protections for Moros 
or Tamils. Given the support found in the academic literature for the role of committed actors in 
seeing transitional justice mechanisms enacted in peace agreements, qualitative investigation of 
additional peace processes is required for a better evaluation of this hypothesis.  
H4: Domestic NGOs with similar missions and agendas will be more likely to partner 
and cooperate with like-minded INGOs during the peace process that D / INGOs of diverging 
philosophies or purposes. 
I find support for this hypothesis, but with interesting observations that do not exactly fit 
within this expectation. First is the practice of cross-partnering among NGOs. For example, 
Oxfam, a development organization, constructed an extensive program aimed at conflict 
reduction activities. This required partnerships with local groups that were engaged in peace and 
conflict resolution activities and less focused on economic development. Additionally, in a crisis 
with few overarching structures for coordination, as in the aftermath of the Sri Lankan tsunami, 
it appears that INGOs distribute the vast influx of resources as quickly (and indiscriminately) as 
possible. Most of the time however, it appears that INGOs and domestic groups match 
themselves based upon similar interests or purposes. For example, Catholic Relief Services 
International most frequently partnered with Catholic community organizations in the Mindanao 
conflict (Rood 2005). This is not always a good thing; however, as both the Mindanao and Sri 
Lankan conflicts could potentially benefit from a greater number of groups that attempt to 
transcend ethnicity or religion.  
 

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H5: Peace processes that experience high levels of D / INGO involvement, but little 
cooperation and coordination among state and other Track II actors will be less likely to 
experience sustained peace outcomes than cases that have both high levels of D  / INGO 
involvement and cooperation with conflict managers. 
I find very strong support for this hypothesis. The Aceh conflict featured coordination 
between international Track II actors and civil society. Additionally, it appears that Acehnese 
civil society remained on the same page and communicated their goals to the GAM officials at 
the Helsinki talks. I found only one instance of dissent from a few groups challenging GAM 
legitimacy at the talks, but their criticism was quickly mollified when GAM officials agreed to 
hear their concerns in person (Kingsbury 2006). The Mindanao case fits the expectation of 
hypothesis five perfectly. The conflict is characterized by high levels of involvement from 
several civil society groups, but they are not operating in a coherent fashion. Often their 
opposing agendas mitigate their impact.   
H6: Conflicts that feature sustained NGO engagement across all phases of fighting—
active armed hostilities, peace negotiations, and peace agreement implementation—will be more 
likely to experience sustained peace than conflicts with little or inconsistent NGO engagement.  
I also find strong support for hypothesis six. Tables 3, 4, and 5 depict the types of civil 
society engagement at different phases of each conflict. The main takeaway point from 
comparison between these tables is the importance placed on early intervention into the conflict. 
In both the Mindanao and Sri Lankan conflicts, NGOs did not really try to engage the public in 
supporting peace until the conflict had waged for awhile, locking in hardliner opinions. 
Additionally, it is important to consider how these activities were structured. The tables (and my 
theory) do not address the differences in impact between top-down and bottom-up approaches. 

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The Aceh case featured both approaches, with international NGOs like the HDC and CMI 
guiding the peace process and pulling in local actors while local civil society engaged in 
peacebuilding in the field (and under threat of attack from security forces). The Mindanao case is 
primarily a bottom-up endeavor, especially considering the active role local groups have played 
in establishing peace zones and fostering inter-faith dialogue. By contrast, Sri Lankan society is 
noted by top-down, authoritarian structures in most institutions—leaving most citizens feeling 
powerless to end the conflict.  
The effect of these activities appear to be additive. Civil society activists in Aceh 
remained engaged in a wide array of activities during the entire peace process and the 2005 
Memorandum of Understanding is the only peace agreement that remains in force (that actually 
resolved the dispute). However, I maintain that some of these tools are more valuable than 
others. For example, “mobilizing the public” appears to be a necessary component of NGO 
impact. Philippine civil society participated in a fair number of activities to encourage peace 
(albeit later in the conflict than Acehnese activists); however, their inability to shift public 
opinion towards support for the 2008 Cessation of Hostilities agreement led to its downfall. 
Likewise, in the Sri Lankan civil war, most of the public and even some Sinhalese and Buddhist 
nationalist civil society organizations supported fighting. Tamil peace activists could not find a 
space to present alternatives, coming under suspicion from both the government and the Tigers. 
Another type of activity that could conceivably be a necessary or sufficient condition for peace is 
efforts towards demobilization and reintegration of combatants. In the Aceh conflict, I found 
evidence of NGOs assisting with this effort (Aspinall 2008), however, in Sri Lanka, this does not 
appear to be a priority. A longer time frame for analysis is needed; however, to see if there is a 
correlation between demobilization / reintegration activities and sustained peace.  
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 Table 4: Types of NGO engagement during all conflict phases in Aceh 
 Outbreak of Armed 
Hostilities 
Peace Negotiations Peace Agreement (PA) 
Implementation 
Advocacy / Pressure Disputants X X  
Mobilize Public X X X 
Peace Workshops / Peace Education X X X 
Human Rights Documentation X X X 
Facilitate Dialogue X X X 
Consultation / Technical Expertise X X X 
Economic Development  X X 
Monitor PA Implementation   X 
Assist with Combatant 
Demobilization and Reintegration 
  X 
Facilitate Democratic Transition / 
Elections 
  X 
 
Table 5: Types of NGO engagement during all conflict phases in Mindanao 
 Outbreak of Armed 
Hostilities 
Peace Negotiations Peace Agreement (PA) 
Implementation 
Advocacy / Pressure Disputants  X X 
Mobilize Public  X X 
Peace Workshops / Peace Education  X  
Human Rights Documentation  X X 
Facilitate Dialogue X   
Consultation / Technical Expertise  X  
Economic Development X   
Monitor PA Implementation   X 
Assist with Combatant 
Demobilization and Reintegration 
   
Facilitate Democratic Transition / 
Elections 
   
 
Table 6: Types of NGO engagement during all conflict phases in Sri Lanka 
 Outbreak of Armed 
Hostilities 
Peace Negotiations Peace Agreement (PA) 
Implementation 
Advocacy / Pressure Disputants    
Mobilize Public  X X 
Peace Workshops / Peace Education  X X 
Human Rights Documentation  X  
Facilitate Dialogue  X  
Consultation / Technical Expertise    
Economic Development  X  
Monitor PA Implementation    
Assist with Combatant 
Demobilization and Reintegration 
  X 
Facilitate Democratic Transition / 
Elections 
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 In terms of the four step process demonstrating the use of Transnational Advocacy 
Networks, I find a general pattern of conformity to my expectations. With Step 1 (domestic 
groups reach out to INGOs to push for third party conflict management while mobilizing the 
domestic public), I found that there is more emphasis (or at least progress) on the international 
half of the step. More groups reach out to INGOs and establish TANs than focus on the domestic 
side of things, as the public opposition to the peace process in Mindanao and Sri Lanka indicates. 
During Step 2 (INGOs use TANs to raise awareness of the conflict situation and establish 
partnerships with local NGOs), it appears that INGOs most often engage directly with the 
conflict and establish deep partnerships with local actors rather than focus on reporting to other 
organizations and states in the international sphere. Appeals for third party involvement occur, of 
course, but the focus does not seem to be on this objective. Step 3 (involvement in peace 
negotiations) seems to be the exception rather than the rule.  
Even in the Aceh conflict, local civil society representatives had a total of three meetings 
with GAM forces and were not permitted in the actual negotiations. Given both LTTE and Sri 
Lankan government suspicion of Tamil civil society, I found no evidence of consultation with 
these groups at all during peace negotiations. Finally, in Step 4 (domestic and INGO 
involvement in implementation of peace agreements), I found that these actors adopt a 
supplementary role, such as partnering with state monitors in the Aceh Monitoring Mission or 
establishing transparent reporting on ceasefire violations through the Bantay ceasefire group. 
NGOs seem to play a much more active role in economic development and, in Sri Lanka at least, 
are the only actors involved in reconciliation and reintegration of ex-combatants (Perera 2011). 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 
From the analysis of my qualitative investigation, it is now possible to offer a few 
answers to the larger research questions of this thesis. The same caveats about generalizability of 
findings mean, however, that I cannot conclusively determine the impact of Track II engagement 
in civil war peace processes. Yet I find strong support in the affirmative.  
Across the Acehnese, Mindanao and Sri Lankan conflicts, civil society activists have 
conducted activities and workshops to push for peace in varying degrees. The Aceh conflict 
featured the most concentrated NGO and civil society involvement, both in terms of early and 
sustained engagement and in the variety and frequency of activities. Yet there are unique features 
of the Aceh conflict (mediated by INGOs with Finnish, EU and ASEAN support, cohesive civil 
society community whose input was welcomed by GAM representatives, and a well-
implemented disaster relief effort). These unique attributes become necessary conditions for 
Track II impact on the peace process when compared to the Mindanao conflict, which had 
similar levels of NGO activity (albeit later in the conflict cycle), but lacked the features of the 
Acehnese case. 

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I draw most of my theory generating lessons from the Mindanao and Sri Lankan 
conflicts. The collective sense of futility about ending the war in Sri Lanka created a self-
fulfilling prophecy that, in part, explains the Sinhalese annihilation of the Tigers in 2009. 
Furthermore, the case is noted by the relative absence of INGO involvement until immediately 
after the 2004 tsunami, when a surge of INGO involvement swept the region. The relief effort, 
however, was poorly managed and civil society activists were unable to build momentum for 
peace negotiations—a missed opportunity as the post-tsunami environment in Aceh illustrates. 
The Mindanao conflict also refines my theory in demonstrating the ineffectiveness of Track II 
efforts when the civil society community is fractured and unrepresentative of the broader public. 
The following three takeaway points from this thesis illustrate the conditions under which Track 
II efforts are most likely to have an impact on peace negotiations.  
1. A cohesive and representative civil society community that is firmly connected 
to the public at large. 
In both the Mindanao and Sri Lankan conflicts, the civil society community featured a 
preponderance of a certain type of group when compared to the population at large. In 
Mindanao, Christian organizations make up the majority of civil society organizations and, at 
times, these groups fuel bias towards the Muslim Bangsamoro community rather than work to 
change perceptions and promote peace (Rood 2005). Groups that have tried to change public 
opinion towards supporting the 2008 Cessation of Hostilities agreement were unsuccessful, 
drowned out by the outrage over the government’s concessions to the MILF (Rood 2005). 
 In the Sri Lankan case, civil society is dominated by Sinhalese and Buddhist nationalist 
groups that strongly opposed peace at times during the 30-year conflict (Orejuela 2003). Tamil 
activists were excluded almost entirely from the peace process. The biggest lesson from both of 
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these conflicts is the need to strongly engage with the public in order to generate a successful 
peace movement. Public opinion proved surprisingly resilient to change, despite the incredible 
costs of these wars on society at large. While civil society organizations are, in part, a function of 
public support and sanction for their activities, there is room for the relationship to run the other 
way: activists can strategically shift public opinion through coordinated efforts, such as the 
“disaster diplomacy” campaign in Aceh.    
2. INGO involvement in the peace process is well-coordinated and supported by 
states or regional organizations.  
As weaker actors in the international system, INGOs rely on states and regional 
organizations to maximize the impact of their activities and increase the credibility of their 
promises to combatants, third-party mediators, and local NGOs. In the Aceh conflict, the HDC 
and CMI were supported by the Finnish government and the EU and ASEAN committed forces 
to monitor the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding. Without this support, it is difficult to 
imagine whether GAM forces would have accepted the government’s offer of autonomy after 
being burned so many times before (Aspinall 2007; Kingsbury 2006).  
Keck and Sikkink (1998) present a bottom up driven model of changing state behavior in 
that the first step features local NGOs reaching out to the international community. This is 
intuitive, given local groups informational advantages over INGOs and local capacity to 
influence conflict outcomes. However, the Sri Lankan experience demonstrates the need for 
INGOs to perhaps take a more proactive approach in engaging in conflicts. While this is not a 
substitute for local activity, perhaps INGO attention before the 2004 tsunami would have 
fostered more effective relief efforts. In conflicts where civil society is unable or unwilling to 
reach out to the international community for peace, perhaps INGOs should seek local groups out 


to build partnerships and dispense resources rather than waiting to be called upon. Given the 
limited resources of INGOs and the potential of domestic backlash, the feasibility of such a top-
down peace movement requires further investigation.  
3. Track II involvement begins during the early stages of involvement and is 
sustained through a variety of activities over the course of the peace process.  
The resistance of public opinion to peace efforts in the Mindanao and Sri Lankan 
conflicts was perhaps caused by the absence of civil society efforts in the beginning stages of 
conflict. Without leadership offering alternatives to war, public opinion hardened and supported 
retaliation for rebel attacks (Orejuela 2003, Rood 2005). The Aceh conflict, by contrast, featured 
a peace movement from the beginning. This, combined with the representativeness of the civil 
society community, created a close relationship between activists and the public. GAM leaders 
were well aware of this relationship and asked activists to try out a new Indonesian word for 
autonomy (emphasizing “self-determination”) on the public to gauge their reaction before 
proceeding with the next round of the 2005 negotiations (Kingsbury 2006).  Of all the activities 
listed in Table 1, early engagement in the peace process is most vital to the creation of a 
sustained peace effort. Activities that connect civil society organizations to the public and 
mobilize opinion in support of peace are the next most important consideration. Local NGOs are 
best suited for these types of activities, but INGOs may serve as effective conduits between the 
public, combatants and mediators as well.  
Index of Civil Society Involvement 
Using my findings from these case studies and broader takeaway points, I have attempted 
to develop a reliable and valid measure of civil society engagement in a peace process based on 
observable criteria. The index is composed of seven dimensions affecting civil society activities. 


Each measure can be thought of along a spectrum of low-medium-high. The first dimension is 
the sheer number of NGOs and civil society organizations operating in a particular region or 
country. This count variable could be conducted by examining the membership roles of umbrella 
organizations or networks, such as MinCODE in Mindanao. Once compiled, this count could be 
determined as low, medium, high relative to similar conflicts, other conflicts within the region, 
etc.  
The second dimension of my measure concerns the coherence of civil society—how 
many cleavages are there between groups. For example, the Mindanao conflict is characterized 
by a highly fractured civil society—several groups bump heads due to ethnic, religious or 
ideological differences. This dimension should also be interacted with a sense of 
representativeness among civil society groups. Fractured though it is, Philippine civil society is 
also disproportionately representative of Christian Filipinos. By contrast, Sri Lankan civil society 
is small, but heavily comprised of “uncivil” Sinhalese nationalist and Buddhist groups. 
Determining coherence and representativeness of civil society could be conducted through study 
of organizational mission statements, interviews, and public opinion polling. Related to this 
measure is consideration of the relationship between civil society organizations and media 
outlets. Conflicts with state-controlled or biased media operations pose constraints on the ability 
of civil society representatives to get their message out. An interesting tangent to this measure is 
an investigation on the use of social media by domestic civil society groups.  
The fifth element of determining civil society engagement concerns the level of support 
and cooperation between domestic civil society organizations and the international community 
(not just INGOs). Similarly, it is important to consider combatant attitudes towards Track II 
actors—GAM representatives proved quite receptive to civil society suggestions while the LTTE 


viewed Tamil activists as a threat to their legitimacy as “representatives of the will of the Tamil 
people” (Orejuela 2003). The final element of this measure of civil society engagement considers 
the pattern of activities as depicted in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Early involvement in the peace process 
appears particularly important for sustained peace outcomes.  
 In conclusion, this study has illuminated the conditions under which civil society actors 
are most likely to have an impact on the peace process and the peacebuilding activities they 
employ to ripen a conflict for peace. In doing so, my qualitative investigation has raised paths for 
further research. In order to expand the generalizability of my results, I would like to replicate 
this study in another region. Additionally, I would like to employ survey and interview methods 
to add further nuance to my findings. Finally, the project has sparked tangential research 
questions relating to the role of social media in peacebuilding activities. Additionally, I think it 
would be very interesting to examine organizations that engage in cross-partnerships with NGOs 
of other specialities, such as Harris and Lewer’s (2002) in-depth study of Oxfam’s Conflict 
Reduction Program. Ultimately, I would like to develop a systematic way to measure civil 
society involvement in peace processes to offer insights to practitioners engaged in third party 
conflict management.
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